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ENFORCING IMMIGRATION EQUITY 
Jason A. Cade* 
 
Congressional amendments to the immigration code in the 1990s 
significantly broadened grounds for removal while nearly eradicating 
opportunities for discretionary relief.  The result has been a radical 
transformation of immigration law.  In particular, the constriction of 
equitable discretion as an adjudicative tool has vested a new and critical 
responsibility in enforcement officials to implement rigid immigration rules 
in a normatively defensible way, primarily through the use of prosecutorial 
discretion.  This Article contextualizes recent executive enforcement actions 
within this scheme and argues that the Obama Administration’s targeted 
use of limited enforcement resources and implementation of initiatives such 
as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals reflect defensible efforts to 
systematize equitable decision making principles within the new world of 
American immigration law. 
Having laid bare the practical realities of the modern immigration 
system, this Article then argues that reliance on executive discretion alone 
has thus far failed to ensure that individuals are deported only when 
justified.  Of particular importance, the Department of Homeland Security 
under the current administration has all but abandoned any consideration 
of the normative merits of removal when it comes to noncitizens with any 
kind of criminal history.  Indeed, the agency has used criminal history as an 
indiscriminate marker of undesirability, regardless of the seriousness of the 
underlying offense, the passage of time, the permanent resident status of the 
noncitizen, the severity of hardship that deportation would cause for the 
noncitizen’s family, and any other mitigating factors.  A deportation system 
that allocates all responsibility for fairness and proportionality to 
enforcement actors raises other problems as well, including lack of finality 
and heightened risk of conflict with other branches and levels of 
government.  These difficulties in turn can stymie the use of enforcement 
discretion as an effective equitable tool. 
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the Emerging Immigration Scholars conference held at University of Miami.  Laughlin 
Kane, UGA Law ’15, provided excellent research assistance.  Thanks to Dean Peter 
Rutledge, Dean Rebecca White, and the University of Georgia for generous support. 
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The situation cries out for legal redress.  The reinvigoration of 
adjudicative discretion and rollback of overly broad removal grounds 
through statutory reform are goals well worth pursuing, and this Article 
describes important measures that lawmakers might take toward those 
ends.  In the absence of congressional intervention, there remain important 
steps the Executive could take to help ensure the proportionality and 
fairness of the deportation system, despite the drawbacks of enforcement-
based equity.  This Article concludes by suggesting that if neither of the 
political branches takes adequate steps to address this new set of problems, 
it will be left to the federal judiciary to increase structural opportunities for 
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On November 20, 2014, President Barack Obama announced an 
executive program that would allow some undocumented noncitizen parents 
of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (LPRs) to seek a temporary 
reprieve from removal.1  The initiative, called Deferred Action for Parents 
of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), closely resembles 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a similar program 
implemented in 2012 that gave some children and young adults the 
 
 1. See Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., 
http://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/DXN9-
SHLX]. 
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opportunity to apply for discretionary deferment of removal.2  These 
unusual executive immigration actions have drawn fierce criticism from 
some corners3 and praise from others.4  They have been targeted by 
ongoing litigation5 and proposed reversionary legislation.6 
This Article contextualizes DAPA and DACA as part of a significant and 
ongoing transition in immigration law.  These programs, though important 
in themselves, are best seen as one component of the broad relocation of 
equitable authority within the American deportation system from, back-end 
adjudicators to frontline enforcement officials.  This Article explains the 
sources of this transformation, traces the primary ways in which the 
executive branch has attempted to implement equitable enforcement, and 
discusses the drawbacks of our new deportation system, which locates 
discretionary authority almost exclusively in enforcement actors. 
For much of immigration law’s history, immigration judges, as well as 
state and federal sentencing judges in criminal cases concerning 
noncitizens, were granted a large measure of equitable discretion.  In 
deciding individual cases, these adjudicators were empowered to take 
account of the severity of deportation and circumstances that weighed for or 
against the potential deportee.7  In the late twentieth century, however, 
Congress discarded this approach. Instead, amendments to the immigration 
code heralded the rise of criminal history, very broadly defined, as the 
 
 2. Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to León Rodriguez, 
Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enf’t, R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border 
Prot., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the 
United States As Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of 
U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [http://perma.cc/9WFE-WWLN]. 
 3. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Opinion, Why Obama’s Immigration Order Was 
Blocked, WALL STREET. J., Feb. 18, 2015, at A15; Jeff Sessions, Sessions Comments on 
President’s Impending Executive Amnesty Announcement, JEFF SESSIONS:  U.S. SENATOR FOR 
ALA. (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.sessions.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news-releases? 
ID=E06532D6-FAA1-4DC8-9A3A-F310B2CB72CE [http://perma.cc/4FWD-K9LN]; Jan 
Ting, President Obama’s “Deferred Action” Program for Illegal Aliens Is Plainly 
Unconstitutional, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUDS. (Dec. 2014), http://cis.org/Obama-Deferred-
Action-Amnest-Executive-Action-Unconstitutional [http://perma.cc/Y9HU-U5RB]. 
 4. See, e.g., Dick Durbin, Immigration and the DREAM Act, DICK DURBIN:  U.S. 
SENATOR ILL., http://www.durbin.senate.gov/issues/immigration-and-the-dream-act (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/AYN8-J84Z]; ROBERTO G. GONZALES & ANGIE M. 
BAUTISTA-CHAVEZ, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, TWO YEARS AND COUNTING:  ASSESSING 
THE GROWING POWER OF DACA (2014), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/ 
two-years-and-counting-assessing-growing-power-daca [http://perma.cc/9E3T-FVDU]; 
ZENEN JAIMES PÉREZ, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, HOW DACA HAS IMPROVED THE LIVES OF 
UNDOCUMENTED YOUNG PEOPLE (2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/ 
immigration/report/2014/11/19/101868/how-daca-has-improved-the-lives-of-undocumented-
young-people/ [http://perma.cc/5XRQ-WM8R]. 
 5. See Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254, 2015 WL 648579, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 
16, 2015) (preliminarily enjoining expansion of the DACA program and the rollout of the 
DAPA program). 
 6. See, e.g., Defund Amnesty Act of 2015, H.R. 155, 114th Cong. (as introduced by 
House, Jan. 6, 2015). 
 7. See infra Part I. 
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primary marker of undesirability, while squeezing consideration of 
humanitarian or fairness concerns almost completely out of the adjudicative 
stages of deportation or criminal proceedings.  As a result of this statutory 
shift, considerations of equity enter the deportation system (if at all) 
primarily through the discretionary decisions of enforcement actors at both 
federal and state levels.8 
The size of the deportable population in the United States, and the 
inability of most unauthorized persons to regularize their status, amplifies 
the relative importance of enforcement discretion in immigration law.9  
Over eleven million noncitizens living in the United States are potentially 
removable on the basis of immigration violations.10  Many hundreds of 
thousands more are lawfully present but now deportable because of criminal 
convictions.11  These numbers far outrun the enforcement resources that 
Congress has made available to the Executive.  Indeed, current funding 
levels—the highest ever—permit the removal of about 400,000 persons per 
year, a number that must be apportioned between both interior and border 
enforcement.12 
Any normatively justifiable deportation system requires equity.  By 
“equity” or similar terms, this Article means “fair-mindedness” or 
proportionality.13  Equity mitigates the effect of overly broad, punitive, and 
inflexible statutes in ways that help ensure the law is fair and proportional 
 
 8. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 
119 YALE L.J. 458, 518–19 (2009) (“Prosecutorial discretion has thus overtaken the exercise 
of discretion by immigration judges when it comes to questions of relief.”). 
 9. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 19–55 (2014) (explaining 
the political and historical factors that contributed to the size of the current unauthorized 
population and the connection with enforcement discretion); Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 8, 
at 510–14. 
 10. See Unauthorized Immigrant Population, by State, 2012, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 
18, 2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/interactives/unauthorized-immigrants-2012/ 
(indicating that 11.2 million unauthorized persons resided in the United States in 2012) 
[http://perma.cc/L6J3-QVFD]. 
 11. DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH:  DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN 
DIASPORA 12–13 (2012); Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal 
Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 77 (2014); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of 
the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
1936 (2000). 
 12. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, to 
All ICE Emps., Civil Immigration Enforcement:  Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, 
and Removal of Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Priorities Memo], 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf (stating that the 
agency only has resources to remove a maximum of 400,000 persons per year) 
[http://perma.cc/DE48-485T]. 
 13. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not 
to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1658, 1662–88 (2010) (equating “equity” with 
“fair-mindedness” and citing Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence:  A Virtue-Centered 
Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 205 (2003)).  In this Article, I do not use the 
term “equity” in the sense of the specific doctrines or remedies developed in the English 
Court of Chancery, strains of which survive in modern jurisprudence. See generally Samuel 
L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997 (2015).  
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in its application to individual human beings.14  This principle is well 
recognized in criminal law, where the extensive proliferation of penal laws 
to regulate behavior that is not clearly blameworthy, the establishment of 
mandatory minimum sentences, and the general inability of formal law to 
predict and accommodate all possible mitigating circumstances create the 
potential for injustice in many cases.  These features of our criminal law 
have given rise to a system of prosecutorial discretion, under which 
enforcement officials wield wide-ranging authority to determine who 
should be prosecuted and what alleged lawbreakers should be charged 
with.15  While that degree of discretion creates the potential for 
overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial abuse, it is recognized as 
essential to temper and individuate the broad application of severe penalties 
within the criminal law system. 
The removal system similarly imposes dire penalties on the basis of a 
broad range of civil infractions.  These penalties consist primarily of 
deportation followed by lengthy or permanent bars to lawful return, which 
lead to collateral consequences, including the separation of caregivers from 
U.S. citizen children and the loss of workforce.16  Detention during 
deportation proceedings is also rampant.17  Sanctions as severe as these 
should be scaled to the gravity of the underlying offense and balanced 
against the noncitizen’s personal mitigating circumstances.18  Where 
proportionality considerations are not part of back-end adjudicators’ 
discretion, they must be channeled to other parts of the process. 
President Obama’s Administration clearly recognizes that the breadth 
and severity of modern immigration rules, along with the scale of the 
 
 14. See, e.g., Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARTISTOTLE 
bk. V, ch. 10, 1795–96 (Barnes ed., 1984) (“[A]ll law is universal but about some things it is 
not possible to make a universal statement which will be correct. . . .  And this is the nature 
of the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality.”); 
Bowers, supra note 13, at 1685 (“Equitable discretion . . . tempers and thereby perfects 
broad laws.”); see also infra Part III.A. 
 15. See infra Part I.B. 
 16. See infra Part I.A; text accompanying notes 310–15. 
 17. See infra notes 276–79. 
 18. See Austin Lovegrove, Proportionality Theory, Personal Mitigation, and the 
People’s Sense of Justice, 69 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 321, 330 (2010) (“[T]he severity of the 
punishment should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence in question; but it also 
should be appropriate, having regard to the offender’s personal mitigation.”); Andrew von 
Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIME & JUST. 55, 56 (1992) 
(“People have a sense that punishments scaled to the gravity of offenses are fairer than 
punishments that are not.”); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the Proportionality 
Requirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 415, 416 (2012) (“Proportionality is the notion that the 
severity of a sanction should not be excessive in relation to the gravity of an offense.”).  
Concerns based on equity, proportionality, or justice are generally thought to be distinct 
from those based on mercy or forgiveness. See generally Allison Brownell Tirres, Mercy in 
Immigration Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1563 (arguing that immigration reform should be 
centered on the language of justice rather than the language of mercy). But cf. Bowers, supra 
note 13, at 1681 (“A distinction can be drawn between the impulse to unjustly exercise 
mercy to provide an exception from unquestionably deserved punishment and the impulse to 
equitably exercise mercy to bridge the gap ‘between the inflexibility of the law and moral 
justice.’” (quoting Alwynne Smart, Mercy, 43 PHILOSOPHY 345, 355 (1968))). 
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removable noncitizen population, have created a system that consolidates 
tremendous power over the equitable implementation of immigration law in 
enforcement actors.19  It argued as much to the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Arizona v. United States,20 when the administration challenged state 
immigration laws that might interfere with its own enforcement priorities, 
including decisions not to pursue some individuals for equitable reasons.21  
Furthermore, in numerous public statements and internal agency policy 
memoranda, the Obama Administration has signaled its intention to “do the 
right thing” by ensuring that individual deportations are normatively 
justified.22 
Underlying the Executive’s approach to equitable immigration 
enforcement is a system of tiered enforcement priorities, which have 
structured the Administration’s choices about how to distribute limited 
enforcement resources and guided its approach to the exercise of discretion 
in individual cases.23  First, with respect to its distribution of enforcement 
resources, the Obama Administration has shifted the Department of 
Homeland Security’s (DHS) focus toward border removals and programs 
that target noncitizens with criminal histories.  Thus, while the Obama 
Administration has deported far more noncitizens than any previous 
administration, a majority of those removals appear to be recent border 
crossers or “criminal aliens.”24 
Second, since 2011, policy heads in Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), a subagency of DHS, have labored to train and 
encourage agents and attorneys to exercise equitable discretion by deferring 
or eschewing removal in appropriate cases.25  As I have shown elsewhere, 
this administrative move to expand prosecutorial discretion has had mixed 
results.26  Many ICE operatives have strenuously resisted the call for more 
equitable enforcement.27  To be sure, the agency’s efforts in this regard 
have increased consideration of mitigating factors in individual cases to 
some degree.  Even so, ground-level implementation of the prosecutorial 
discretion guidelines remains highly inconsistent across the nation.28 
Third, DACA and DAPA represent large and categorical discretionary 
policy initiatives.  These programs are designed to bring noncitizens who 
meet certain equitable criteria out of the shadows to affirmatively present 
themselves for discretionary consideration of temporary reprieves from 
 
 19. See infra Part I. 
 20. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2013). 
 21. See infra Part II.A. 
 22. See infra Part II.A. 
 23. See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (2012) (charging the Secretary of Homeland Security 
with “[e]stablishing national immigration enforcement policies and priorities”); Morton 
Priorities Memo, supra note 12. 
 24. “Criminal aliens,” as defined by DHS, means noncitizens who have at least one prior 
conviction. See generally infra Part II.B.1. 
 25. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 26. See generally Cade, supra note 11. 
 27. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 28. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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deportation.29  Importantly, the use of the DACA and DAPA mechanisms 
depart from the typical invocation of prosecutorial discretion in that they 
assign equitable assessments to a special unit within a separate DHS 
agency.30  This institutional design for discretionary consideration offers 
the possibility of significant gains in transparency and consistency, not least 
because of the crushing workloads currently facing ICE prosecutors in 
deportation court.31  On the other hand, this division of agency functions 
has led some observers to argue that these programs involve the affirmative 
grant of benefits as opposed to discretionary forbearance with regard to 
removal.32  Indeed, on February 16, 2015, a federal district court 
preliminarily enjoined the rollout of DAPA along with the expanded 
version of DACA announced by President Obama in late 2014.33 
Although some critics of President Obama’s enforcement policies argue 
he is “soft” on immigration,34 the on-the-ground reality is more complex.  
The immigration enforcement agencies have taken an increasingly hard line 
against all noncitizens defined as “criminal aliens.”35  This designation all 
but guarantees removal, regardless of the seriousness of the underlying 
offense, the passage of time, the permanent resident status of the noncitizen, 
the degree of hardship that deportation would cause the noncitizen’s family, 
or other mitigating factors.36  In addition, government attorneys have 
pushed for expansive interpretations of the already broad criminal grounds 
of deportation, and they continue to do so even in the face of multiple 
reversals by the U.S. Supreme Court for ignoring “common sense.”37  The 
most recent of these cases, Mellouli v. Lynch,38 concerned the government’s 
deportation of a lawful permanent resident with significant equities who 
had been convicted of possessing a sock as drug paraphernalia.39 
The government’s stringent, indiscriminate approach with respect to 
noncitizens who encounter the criminal justice system manifests in other 
ways as well.  ICE operatives teach sympathetic local district attorneys’ 
offices how to maximize the likelihood of removal following prosecution.40  
 
 29. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 30. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 31. See Cade, supra note 11, at 50–54; see also infra text accompanying notes 206–09, 
222–36. 
 32. See infra Part III.B. 
 33. Michael D. Shear & Julia Preston, Dealt Setback, Obama Puts Off Immigrant Plan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2015, at A1. See generally infra Part III.B. 
 34. See, e.g., Caitlin Dickson, Is Obama Really the Deporter-in-Chief?  Yes and No., 
DAILY BEAST (April 30, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/30/is-obama-
really-the-deporter-in-chief-yes-and-no.html (“To immigration enforcement hawks, 
[President Obama] is soft on illegal migrants, using his executive authority to make the 
interior of the country a haven for certain classes of undocumented immigrants.”) 
[http://perma.cc/P8LT-88F6]. 
 35. See infra Part III.A. 
 36. See Julia Preston, Report Finds Deportations Focus on Criminal Records, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2014, at A16. 
 37. See infra Part III.A. 
 38. 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015). 
 39. Id. at 1985. 
 40. See infra Part III.A. 
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Even arrests without conviction can trigger regulatory enforcement, as 
cooperative and integrated data-sharing programs in the criminal justice 
system have become ICE’s primary method of identifying deportable 
noncitizens in the interior United States.41  Noncitizens with convictions are 
frequently detained during the pendency of removal proceedings.42  
Furthermore, federal authorities outside the DHS now actively participate in 
the deportation (and criminalization) of noncitizens; indeed, crimes of 
migration (i.e., illegal entry or illegal reentry) have become the most 
prosecuted federal offenses by U.S. Attorneys.43 
In short, while the rise in prosecutorial discretion initiatives and the 
shifting of resources reflect an executive branch grappling with its 
obligation to implement immigration enforcement in normatively justifiable 
ways, the DHS under Obama has also embraced criminal history as a near-
irrevocable proxy for noncitizen undesirability.  Moreover, what qualifies 
as criminal history for this purpose is extremely broad—most of the 
criminal aliens removed in recent years have been convicted only of 
migration crimes, traffic offenses, or other misdemeanors.44  Thus, equity 
through enforcement discretion has fallen short when it comes to 
noncitizens who encounter the criminal justice system. 
There are other drawbacks to lodging deportation discretion exclusively 
in the hands of criminal and immigration law enforcers.  Intense workloads, 
law enforcement biases, policy resistance, and other features of the removal 
system increase the likelihood that the DHS’s ground-level operatives will 
inconsistently consider equity in enforcement decisions.45  Enforcement-
based equity also fails to provide the finality that has historically 
accompanied adjudicative discretionary relief, because it does not actually 
confer a change in immigration status, instead leaving the noncitizen in 
perpetual limbo.46  Finally, attempts to systematize equitable consideration 
through enforcement discretion are more likely to be met with skepticism 
and controversy, as demonstrated by litigation and legislation embroiling 
President Obama’s rollout of the DACA and DAPA initiatives.47 
This situation cries out for redress.  Instead of continuing to rely on 
prosecutorial discretion to ensure fairness in the deportation system, 
Congress should enact legislation that both scales back the breadth of 
removal provisions and restores opportunities for adjudicators to balance 
equities in a wider swath of individual cases.  Likewise, Congress should 
consider legalization programs that would allow undocumented persons 
with significant equities to become lawfully present, thus easing the burden 
on enforcement officials to sort out which of the eleven million removable 
noncitizens would not justifiably be deported.  These reforms are critical if 
 
 41. See infra text accompanying notes 171–90, 282–84. 
 42. See infra text accompanying notes 276–79. 
 43. See infra text accompanying notes 280–81. 
 44. See infra text accompanying notes 191–92, 247–72. 
 45. See infra text accompanying notes 200–11, 238–45. 
 46. See infra Part III.C. 
 47. See infra Part III.B. 
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we want a removal system that consistently avoids disproportionate 
deportations. 
It must be acknowledged, however, that comprehensive reform of 
statutory immigration law is notoriously difficult to accomplish.48  
Furthermore, even if Congress were to enact new laws in the near future, 
lawmakers might not significantly retreat from the criminal history proxy or 
establish wide scale legalization.49  In the absence of legislative reform, the 
Executive must continue to strive to implement immigration laws in 
normatively justifiable ways, including when it seeks to deport noncitizens 
with criminal history.  To be sure, this path to proportionality will continue 
to present challenges, and the controversy and litigation that have stymied 
programs like DACA may persuade executive branch officials that efforts 
to make equitable enforcement more systematic and transparent carry 
significant political risk.  It would not be entirely surprising if, under future 
administrations, DHS either throws enforcement discretion completely to 
the wind or returns to the internal, secretive processes that were more 
common in the 1970s.50  Those results would be unfortunate, but given 
these realities, it ultimately may be left to courts to increase structural 
opportunities for equitable consideration through closer scrutiny of the 
removal system.51 
In undertaking the above analysis, this Article connects and contributes 
to several literatures.  First, it continues recent work that a number of 
scholars have published on the role (and efficacy) of prosecutorial 
discretion in immigration law.52  This Article contextualizes wide scale 
prosecutorial discretion as a necessary, if imperfect, component of a system 
 
 48. See Burgess Everett & Seung Min Kim, Immigration Reform Looks Dead in This 
Congress, POLITICO (Mar. 9, 2015, 5:36 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/ 
immigration-reform-congress-115880.html [http://perma.cc/CT26-GHMC]. 
 49. Much like criminal laws, political incentives tend toward the punitive when it comes 
to regulating noncitizens with any criminal history. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological 
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 523–64 (2001) (describing legislators’ 
political incentives in enacting punitive criminal codes). 
 50. See Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service Goes Public:  The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act, 14 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 42, 42–43 (1976). 
 51. See Jason Cade, Mellouli in the Context of the Modern Deportation System, 
CRIMMIGRATION (June 5, 2015), http://crimmigration.com/2015/06/05/mellouli-in-the-
context-of-the-modern-deportation-system/ [http://perma.cc/XD8P-KKVL]. 
 52. For a representative but incomplete sampling of this literature, see generally 
MOTOMURA, supra note 9; SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION:  THE ROLE 
OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES (2015); Cade, supra note 11; Jason 
A. Cade, Policing the Immigration Police:  ICE Prosecutorial Discretion and the Fourth 
Amendment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 180 (2013); Erin Corcoran, Seek Justice, Not Just 
Deportation:  How to Improve Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 48 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 119 (2014); Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 8; Joseph Landau, DOMA and 
Presidential Discretion:  Interpreting and Enforcing Federal Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 619 
(2012); David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion:  The Legal and 
Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 167 (2012); Hiroshi 
Motomura, The Discretion That Matters:  Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and 
Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819 (2011); Nina Rabin, 
Victims or Criminals?  Discretion, Sorting, and Bureaucratic Culture in the U.S. 
Immigration System, 23 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 195 (2014). 
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institutionally designed to locate primary responsibility for equitable 
decision making in enforcement actors.53  More particularly, it parses and 
explains distinctions between individual case-by-case discretion, categorical 
initiatives like DACA and DAPA, and the use of targeted enforcement 
resources within this institutional design.  Second, this Article draws on a 
substantial body of scholarly work on the integration of criminal law and 
immigration enforcement,54 pointing out the particular implications of 
“crimmigration law” for the administration of equity in the modern removal 
system. 
Third, this Article connects the role of prosecutorial discretion in 
immigration law with an emerging literature that argues for more 
proportionality in the immigration system—work that thus far has focused 
primarily on theoretical judicial challenges and legislative reforms.55  To be 
sure, I concur with many commentators that Congress should amend the 
immigration code to roll back overly broad removal provisions and restore 
 
 53. Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez thoughtfully described in 2009 how reforms to 
the immigration code, as well as other historical and political developments in immigration 
law, have shifted substantial screening power over the admission and removal of immigrants 
to the executive branch and particularly to enforcement officials. See Cox & Rodríguez, 
supra note 8.  In this Article, I rely primarily on the lens of proportionality to elaborate on 
that seminal work. 
 54. For a representative but incomplete sampling of this literature, see generally Jennifer 
M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders:  Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National 
Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007); Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens:  
An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126 (2013); César 
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1457; Daniel 
Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented:  Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 
11th “Pale of Law”, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639 (2004); Allegra M. McLeod, The 
U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
105 (2012); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime 
Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81 (2005); David Alan Sklansky, 
Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157 (2012); Juliet 
Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis:  Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. 
REV. 367 (2006); Yolanda Vázquez, Constructing Crimmigration:  Latino Subordination in 
a “Post-Racial” World, 76 OHIO STATE L.J. 599 (2015). 
 55. See KANSTROOM, supra note 11, at 216–24 (arguing that the United States should 
look to international human rights law for models of proportionality in the administration of 
immigration law); Angela M. Banks, The Normative and Historical Cases for Proportional 
Deportation, 62 EMORY L.J. 1243, 1303 (2013) (arguing for legislative reforms that would 
“grant the right to remain to categories of noncitizens based on immigration status, length of 
residence, family ties, military service, or other factors that accurately reflect connections”); 
Jordan Cunnings, Nonserious Marijuana Offenses and Noncitizens:  Uncounseled Pleas and 
Disproportionate Consequences, 62 UCLA L. REV. 510, 560–68 (2015) (arguing primarily 
for legislative solutions to reduce the possibility of deportation on the basis of minor 
marijuana offenses); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:  Asymmetric 
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 520, 524–27 (2007) 
(arguing that courts could recognize and enforce greater procedural rights in immigration 
court to prevent “crime-related deportations [that] are grossly out of proportion to the 
underlying misconduct”); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 
1728–40 (2009) (exploring possibilities for a legislative scheme that would calibrate 
immigration sanctions based on the underlying goals of the immigration system and the 
strength of the noncitizen’s family and community ties); Wishnie, supra note 18, at 416 
(arguing that individual removal orders should be subject to constitutional challenges based 
on disproportionality). 
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adjudicative equity, and I offer guidelines toward those ends.  But I also 
confront the fact that prospects for legislative reform in this area remain 
dim and accordingly suggest practical measures the Executive might 
undertake to improve proportionality and fairness in the removal system. 
Part I of this Article explains how the statutory amendments that 
broadened the criminal removal grounds and narrowed adjudicative equity, 
along with a substantial mismatch between funding and the size of the 
deportable population, have delegated to enforcement officials the 
responsibility to keep the system normatively just.  Part II discusses the 
Obama Administration’s efforts to systematize and implement equitable 
enforcement discretion by focusing on resource distribution, prosecutorial 
discretion, and the deferred action initiatives.  Part III identifies the 
drawbacks and limits of enforcement discretion, highlighting the 
Administration’s failure to ensure that noncitizens—specifically those with 
only minor criminal history—are not unjustifiably deported.  Part IV 
outlines a range of potential legislative and executive actions that would 
improve the deportation system’s commitment to proportionality.  Finally, 
this Article concludes that in the absence of adequate legislative or 
executive reform toward these ends, courts may end up playing a greater 
role in regulating the deportation system. 
I.  THE DECLINE OF FORMAL EQUITY IN IMMIGRATION LAW 
Broadly speaking, two groups of noncitizens are subject to deportation 
under U.S. immigration law.  One consists of undocumented persons, who 
are deportable merely on the basis of being present in the United States 
without authorization.56  The other group consists of lawfully present 
noncitizens who become deportable after being convicted of certain 
offenses or who engage in other prohibited behavior, such as unlawful 
voting.  As the following sections explain, over time Congress has reduced 
the opportunities for noncitizens in either group to avoid deportation 
through adjudicative equitable discretion, instead shifting to a system that 
depends heavily on enforcement discretion to ensure proportionality. 
A.  A Categorically Unforgiving Code 
Immigration law today extensively relies on criminal history, both before 
and after entry to the United States, to screen out undesirable noncitizens.  
Beginning in 1917, Congress periodically enacted laws providing for the 
deportation of noncitizens convicted of certain crimes, subject to 
 
 56. The applicable statutory provision depends on whether the noncitizen entered 
without inspection, overstayed an authorized period of admission, or failed to comply with 
specific visa requirements. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 2002 
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012) (providing that persons present in the 
United States without having been admitted are inadmissible); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) 
(providing that persons who overstay authorized periods of admission are deportable); id. 
§ 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (providing that persons who violate the terms of their admission are 
deportable). 
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limitations, with various possibilities for relief.57  Until the late twentieth 
century, however, criminal history did not play a significant role in 
determining the desirability of noncitizens, whether already inside U.S. 
borders or seeking entry for the first time.58  The criminal grounds for 
removal that did exist were generally subject to limitations that prevented 
lawfully resident noncitizens from being deported on the basis of conduct 
that occurred long ago, or after they had been in lawful permanent status for 
a significant period of time.59  Additionally, those who were subject to 
deportation, whether lawfully present or not, were usually afforded the 
opportunity to argue that their positive equities and connections in the 
United States outweighed the gravity of their infractions, even when 
convicted of serious criminal activity.60 
Today, immigration penalties are deeply enmeshed with (and often 
unavoidable consequences of) criminal convictions.61  As the Supreme 
Court observed in Padilla v. Kentucky,62 even minor convictions trigger 
detention, establish grounds for the removal of LPRs and other noncitizens, 
restrict most discretionary relief, and generally preclude the possibility of 
lawful return to the United States.63  In the modern immigration code, 
criminal history has become a nearly irrevocable proxy for undesirability. 
The hardwiring of the criminal history proxy consists of statutory 
provisions that impose immigration consequences on the basis of 
convictions.  In the late twentieth century, Congress significantly expanded 
the kinds of criminal conduct triggering immigration consequences.64  The 
precise consequences vary depending on the nature of the conviction and 
(sometimes) sentence, but they include deportation, detention, and 
 
 57. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, §§ 3, 19, 39 Stat. 874 (providing for the 
deportation of noncitizens convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years 
of entry, or two crimes involving moral turpitude at any time, if a sentence of one year or 
more was imposed). See generally DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION:  OUTSIDERS 
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 133–36 (2007); Hernández, supra note 54, at 1464–66. 
 58. According to the federal government’s statistics, between 1892 and 1984, 14,287 
persons were excluded on the basis of a criminal or narcotics violation, out of a total of 
633,918 exclusions during that period. U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., 1996 
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 175 tbl.60.  
During the period between 1908 and 1980, 56,669 persons were deported on the basis of a 
criminal or narcotics violation, out of a total of 812,915 persons deported during that period. 
Id. at 183 tbl.65. See generally Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in 
Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1758 (2013). 
 59. See generally THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:  
PROCESS AND POLICY 664–74 (7th ed. 2012); Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 
20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 621–24 (2006). 
 60. See infra text accompanying notes 96–102. 
 61. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365–66 (2010); see also id. at 369 (noting that 
removal is a “presumptively mandatory” consequence of a wide range of convictions).  
Indeed, the breadth of the criminal history proxy in modern immigration law led the Padilla 
Court to expand noncitizens’ Sixth Amendment right to effective criminal counsel to include 
accurate information about the immigration consequences of convictions. Id.; see also Cade, 
supra note 51. 
 62. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 63. See infra text accompanying notes 70–85, 100–15. 
 64. See generally Morawetz, supra note 11. 
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prohibition on lawful return, either for a lengthy period or permanently.  At 
the same time, Congress tightly constricted opportunities for discretionary 
relief from removal at both the federal and state levels. 
The most significant new criminal deportation ground enacted in this 
period was the “aggravated felony.”65  Crimes that fall within the 
aggravated felony category trigger mandatory detention, deportation, and a 
permanent bar on lawful return to the United States.66  Aggravated felons 
are statutorily disqualified from eligibility for asylum or other discretionary 
relief from removal.67  Additionally, any noncitizen who is not an LPR and 
who has a conviction that DHS deems an aggravated felony can be placed 
in the “administrative removal” process—an expedited forum that offers 
even fewer protections or opportunities for remedial leniency than are 
available in regular immigration court.68 
Aggravated felonies initially consisted of only three serious offenses:  
murder, firearms trafficking, and drug trafficking.69  Now the list includes 
twenty-eight offenses.70  The aggravated felony categories encompass many 
minor offenses, including crimes defined as misdemeanors and barely 
punished under state penal law.71  Case law is replete with examples of how 
broadly and indiscriminately the aggravated felony category can reach, 
encompassing misdemeanor battery where no jail time is served, the sale of 
 
 65. INA § 101(a)(43)(A)–(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)–(U) (2012). 
 66. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (“Any alien . . . who seeks admission . . . at any 
time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony[] is inadmissible.”). 
 67. See id. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (aggravated felony considered to be a “particularly serious 
crime” barring asylum and withholding of removal); id. § 1229b(a)(3) (cancellation of 
removal unavailable to LPRs convicted of an aggravated felony); id. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) 
(cancellation of removal unavailable to non-LPRs convicted of an aggravated felony or other 
criminal offenses specified in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3)). 
 68. See id. § 1228(b)(1)–(2). See generally JOHN F. SIMANSKI, DEP’T. OF HOMELAND 
SEC.:  OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS:  2013 2, 
Box 1 (2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_ 
2013.pdf (“Administrative Removal:  The removal of an alien not admitted for permanent 
residence, or of an alien admitted for permanent residence on a conditional basis pursuant to 
section 216 of the INA, under a DHS order based on the determination that the individual 
has been convicted of an aggravated felony  (INA § 238(b)(1)).  The alien may be removed 
without a hearing before an immigration judge.”) [http://perma.cc/VF52-KR5Z]; ALISON 
SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43892, ALIEN REMOVALS AND RETURNS:  OVERVIEW AND 
TRENDS 9–10 (2015) (describing expedited removal of non-LPRs deemed to have been 
convicted of aggravated felonies pursuant to INA section 238(b)). 
 69. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7342, 7344(a), 102 Stat. 
4181, 4469–71 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012)). 
 70. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)–(U).  Although there are only twenty-one subsections, 
several of the sections describe multiple offenses. See, e.g., id. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (defining 
aggravated felony to include murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor).  Some of the 
aggravated felony grounds create further subcategories. See, e.g., id. § 1101(a)(43)(F) 
(crimes of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16 “for which the term of imprisonment [is] at 
least one year”); id. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (theft offenses “for which the term of imprisonment 
[is] at least one year”). 
 71. See, e.g., id. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (theft offenses “for which the term of imprisonment 
[is] at least one year”). 
674 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
a single marijuana cigarette, simple marijuana possession (in some 
circumstances), petty shoplifting offenses, and other minor crimes.72 
Congress has also expanded the narcotics ground of removal to include 
any controlled substance offense.  Lawfully present noncitizens with a 
controlled substance conviction, with the tiny exception of a single 
conviction for simple possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana, find 
themselves deportable and subject to mandatory detention during the 
pendency of their proceedings.73  Although many states punish 
misdemeanor drug offenses only with small fines,74 the level of punishment 
does not matter in triggering the controlled substance ground of removal.75  
Convictions for “domestic violence” crimes also trigger deportation, and, as 
with the controlled substance ground, the immigration code is indifferent as 
to whether the state provides for lenient sentences, diversion, or alternatives 
to incarceration.76 
Crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT) are another expansive 
deportation category that includes both serious and minor offenses.  For 
example, the CIMT category includes petty shoplifting,77 theft of service 
offenses like turnstile jumping,78 misdemeanor indecent exposure,79 and 
passing bad checks.80  Lawfully present noncitizens are deportable for one 
CIMT committed within five years of admission, or two CIMTs at any 
time, even if the criminal punishment amounts only to a fine or community 
service.81  While this category has been a ground of removal for nearly a 
century, until the 1990s multiple levels of equitable consideration were 
baked into the immigration code, giving both criminal and immigration 
judges authority to consider whether removal was appropriate in individual 
cases.82  Today, the commission of two CIMTs all but compels 
 
 72. See Cade, supra note 58. 
 73. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
 74. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357(b) (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 18-18-406(1) (2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.027(4) (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 453.336(4)(a) (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-10(a)(4) (West 2013); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW §§ 221.05, .10 (McKinney 2013). 
 75. Cade, supra note 58, at 1760; 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B). 
 76. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E). 
 77. Da Rosa Silva v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1011 
(E.D. Pa. 2003) (holding that shoplifting is a crime constituting moral turpitude). 
 78. See Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 79. See Matter of Cortes Medina, 26 I. & N. Dec. 79, 80 (B.I.A. 2013) (holding that 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 314(1) (2012), which includes misdemeanor-level indecent exposure 
violations, is a CIMT). 
 80. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-2.4 (West 2013) (classifying the offense of 
passing bad checks as a “disorderly persons offense”); Baer v. Norene, 79 F.2d 340, 341 (9th 
Cir. 1935) (describing check forgery as an offense that involves moral turpitude); Susan L. 
Pilcher, Justice Without a Blindfold:  Criminal Proceedings and the Alien Defendant, 50 
ARK. L. REV. 269, 312–13 (1997) (explaining that passing bad checks is a crime that may 
involve moral turpitude under deportation law). 
 81. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (CIMT within five years of admission).  Two CIMTs 
make noncitizens deportable regardless of whether either was committed within five years of 
admission. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
 82. See infra notes 95–101 and accompanying text. 
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deportation.83  Finally, although a single CIMT conviction does not 
categorically bar discretionary relief, in most cases no such relief will be 
available as a practical matter, as explained more thoroughly below.84 
A host of other criminal offenses inevitably lead to deportation.85  In 
addition, although not all grounds of deportation mandate detention, 
noncitizens facing any criminal ground of removal are often detained on a 
discretionary basis.86  Indeed, it appears that Congress has required that at 
least 34,000 persons be kept in immigration detention every single day.87 
Members of Congress also were concerned about noncitizens who 
managed to avoid conviction-based removals, despite their admission of 
guilt, through deferred adjudication or similar criminal court processes.88  
The legislative solution was to enact, as part of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), a special, broader 
definition of “conviction” for immigration purposes.89  Thus, under the 
current immigration code, a noncitizen qualifies as “convicted” so long as 
there was an adjudication or admission of guilt plus the imposition of any 
kind of penalty.90  This expansive definition is of rising importance because 
state legislatures, prosecutors, and criminal court judges increasingly rely 
on diversion programs as opposed to incarceration for a wide range of 
offenses, including low-level drug, domestic violence, and traffic crimes.91  
The key point is that even lawfully present persons who are tracked into 
diversion programs—and thus have the chance to clear their records for 
 
 83. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (convictions of two or more crimes involving moral 
turpitude make any noncitizen deportable regardless of the length of sentence or date of 
commission); id. § 1229b(b)(1)(B)–(C) (nonpermanent residents ineligible for cancellation 
of removal if they lack good moral character or if convicted under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), 
1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3)). 
 84. See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 85. See generally MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITY:  A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN-BORN DEFENDANTS (5th ed. 2012). 
 86. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention As Punishment, 
61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1348–50, 1379–88 (2014). 
 87. Ted Robbins, Little-Known Immigration Mandate Keeps Detention Beds Full, NPR 
(Nov. 19, 2013, 3:05 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/11/19/245968601/little-known-
immigration-mandate-keeps-detention-beds-full [http://perma.cc/VJ5L-JR9R].  Some 
scholars have argued that Congress has required only that 34,000 detention beds be 
available, not necessarily that they be filled. See, e.g., César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, 
More Humane Immigration Law, CRIMMIGRATION (March 17, 2014), http://crimmigration. 
com/2014/03/17/more-humane-immigration-law/ [http://perma.cc/LKU9-6LK9]. 
 88. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 224 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (indicating that 
members of Congress intended that a confession of guilt would be sufficient to establish a 
conviction for immigration purposes, even in cases where adjudication is deferred). See 
generally Jason A. Cade, Deporting the Pardoned, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 355, 380–81, 
418–19 (2012). 
 89. INA § 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2012) (defining “conviction” as “a 
formal judgment of guilt . . . entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, 
where—(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty 
or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the 
judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be 
imposed”). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Cade, supra note 88, at 394–401. 
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state law purposes—remain “convicted” for federal immigration law 
purposes and are subject to deportation and other immigration 
consequences. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA) broad definition of 
conviction has facilitated other harsh results that many in Congress likely 
never foresaw but that are now commonplace.92  For example, the agency 
has applied this provision to justify removing noncitizens while their 
appeals were still pending on direct appeal,93 as well as persons whose 
convictions were judicially expunged or vacated on rehabilitative rather 
than procedural grounds.94 
Even as Congress dramatically expanded criminal-based deportation, it 
simultaneously took a scalpel to the statutory opportunities for equitable 
adjudicatory assessment that had been a part of immigration law since the 
enactment of the first criminal deportation provisions.  To begin with, 
Congress removed the ability of state law enforcement actors to avert the 
immigration consequences of convictions.  From 1917 to 1990, the INA had 
explicitly delegated to state or federal judges presiding over noncitizen 
criminal cases the “authority to decide whether a particular conviction 
should be disregarded as a basis for deportation.”95  This mechanism, which 
authorized issuance of a Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation 
(JRAD), was grounded in the understanding that the criminal court judge 
had access to valuable information about the facts of the crime and the 
 
 92. See, e.g., Matter of Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I.& N. Dec. 512, 529–46 (B.I.A. 1999) 
(Villageliu, Board Member, dissenting) (noting that the legislative record for IIRIRA only 
evinced intent to eliminate deferred adjudications and said nothing of vacaturs and 
expungements). 
 93. See, e.g., Waugh v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 2011) (agreeing with the 
Government’s argument that under the INA’s definition of conviction, noncitizens may be 
deported while their convictions are still pending on direct appeal); Planes v. Holder, 652 
F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2011) (same); Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (same); Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1009 (5th Cir. 1999) (observing in dicta that 
IIRIRA abrogated the finality rule); Respondent’s Answer to Petition for Rehearing En Banc 
at 6–7, Planes, 652 F.3d 991 (No. 07-70730) (presenting the government’s argument that 
under the INA’s definition of conviction, noncitizens may be deported while their 
convictions are still pending on direct appeal). 
 94. Convictions that have been vacated for procedural or substantive defects generally 
will not trigger immigration consequences.  The complex and inconsistent body of law in 
this area follows a tortuous legislative and judicial history. See generally Matter of 
Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 624 (B.I.A. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, Pickering v. 
Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006); Matter of Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1378, 
1379–80 (B.I.A. 2000); Matter of Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512 (B.I.A. 1999), rev’d 
on other grounds, Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 749 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding on 
equal protection grounds that expungement of first time drug offenses under state law should 
be given preclusive effect where the offender would meet the requirements of the Federal 
First Offender Act (FFOA)), overruled by Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 688 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (holding that equal protection does not require expunged state convictions to be 
treated the same as federal drug convictions expunged under FFOA); Cade, supra note 88. 
 95. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 362 (2010) (quoting Janvier v. United States, 793 
F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1986)); see also Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The 
Sentencing Judge As Immigration Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131, 1145–51 (2002) (discussing 
Judicial Recommendations Against Deportation). 
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defendant’s circumstances.96  JRADs offered sentencing judges a powerful 
tool to avert unjust removals.97  In 1990, however, Congress stripped state 
and federal courts of the ability to issue this equitable relief.98  Another 
equity-squelching legislative reform from the 1990s affected state authority 
to limit the impact of convictions in the interest of justice, allowing 
immigration authorities to treat many (though not all) convictions as 
deportable offenses even when the noncitizen has been fully and 
unconditionally pardoned.99 
Congress also slashed adjudicative equitable relief at the federal level in 
this era.  Before 1996, immigration judges were authorized by the INA to 
determine whether deportation was warranted in individual cases based on 
factors such as the nature of the offense, the length of the noncitizen’s 
residence, the hardship that deportation would visit on the noncitizen’s 
family members, and evidence of rehabilitation.100  Immigration judges 
were empowered to make this determination for both lawfully present and 
undocumented noncitizens.101 
The modern discretionary analogue, called “cancellation of removal,” is 
less generous.  To determine whether to grant this relief, immigration 
judges “must balance the adverse factors evidencing the alien’s 
undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane 
considerations presented in his (or her) behalf . . . .”102  For LPRs, 
cancellation is available only to those noncitizens who have resided 
continuously in the United States for seven years after lawful admission and 
who have been in LPR status for at least five years.103  Furthermore, to 
qualify, noncitizens must have “good moral character” within the preceding 
 
 96. See, e.g., Yolanda Vazquez, Advising Noncitizen Defendants on the Immigration 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions:  The Ethical Answer for the Criminal Defense 
Lawyer, the Court, and the Sixth Amendment, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 31, 39–40 (2010).  
Stephen Lee has suggested that another policy goal promoted by JRADs is increased 
transparency and supervision over the ways that criminal justice actors influence 
downstream immigration consequences. Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 553, 598–99 (2013). 
 97. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 361–62. 
 98. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990). 
 99. See generally Cade, supra note 88, at 373–80; Stacy Caplow, Governors!  Seize the 
Law:  A Call to Expand the Use of Pardons to Provide Relief from Deportation, 22 B.U. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 293 (2013); Samuel T. Morison, Presidential Pardons and Immigration Law, 
6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 253 (2010). 
 100. See Lory D. Rosenberg & Denyse Sabagh, A Practitioner’s Guide to INA § 212(c), 
93-04 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 1 (1993). 
 101. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82–414, § 212(c), 66 Stat. 
163, 187, repealed by IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 
3009-597 (1996); former INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (repealed Sept. 30, 1996) (providing 
for suspension of deportation for non-LPRs); see also IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW 
SOURCEBOOK 1353 (14th ed. 2014) (citing cases holding that lawful domicile was sufficient 
for 212(c) relief, but noting some cases held to the contrary). 
 102. Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998).  The discretionary positive 
and negative criteria for those eligible to seek LPR cancellation remain roughly the same as 
they were for 212(c) relief. See id.; Matter of Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 186 (B.I.A. 
1984); Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584–85 (B.I.A. 1978). 
 103. See INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012). 
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seven years, defined to exclude persons who have been incarcerated for an 
aggregate of 180 days or more.104  Even for this small group of noncitizens, 
commission of any removable offense or service of an immigration court 
charging document stops the accrual of time for purposes of establishing 
continuous residence.105  Although not explicitly prohibited from seeking 
cancellation of removal, permanent residents deportable under the CIMT 
provision are by definition foreclosed from establishing the seven year 
residency requirement to qualify for this relief due to the time-stopping 
provision.106  And, as already mentioned, noncitizens deportable on the 
aggravated felony ground are statutorily ineligible for this or other 
discretionary relief from removal proceedings, regardless of hardship, the 
strength of their ties in the United States, the passage of time since their 
offense, or whether their offense would have been classified as an 
aggravated felony at the time of conviction.107 
Noncitizens who are not LPRs are even less likely to secure discretionary 
relief from removal under this provision.108  Such persons must show ten 
years of continuous physical presence in the United States immediately 
preceding the application and ten years of “good moral character” at the 
time of adjudication.109  They must also demonstrate that removal would 
result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a spouse, parent, 
or child.  Notably, this family member must be a citizen or LPR for this 
hardship to qualify.110  As with LPR cancellation, continuous physical 
presence is deemed to end upon commission of certain criminal acts or 
service of the charging document.111  Moreover, Congress capped the 
number of non-LPRs who could receive cancellation at 4000 annually.112  
This statutory limit is significant; over the last half-decade, the cap on 
available cancellation grants for non-LPRs has been reached early each 
fiscal year.113  Finally, Congress also has significantly limited judicial 
review of what little adjudicatory discretion remains.114 
 
 104. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f), 1229b(a). 
 105. See id. § 1229b(d)(1)(A)–(B). 
 106. See Morawetz, supra note 11, at 1941 (observing that commission of a crime stops 
accumulation of seven years residence for purposes of qualifying for cancellation of 
removal, functionally preventing a noncitizen deportable on the basis of having committed a 
CIMT within five years of entry from accessing this relief). 
 107. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).  Various other factors or inadmissibility grounds also bar 
certain noncitizens from seeking LPR cancellation. See id. § 1229b(c). 
 108. See id. § 1229b(b). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id.  Even vacated convictions may be used to foreclose noncitizens from 
establishing good moral character for purposes of non-LPR cancellation. See, e.g., Nunez-
Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 111. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d). 
 112. Id. § 1229b(e)(1). 
 113. See Margaret Taylor, What Happened to Non-LPR Cancellation? Rationalizing 
Immigration Enforcement by Restoring Durable Relief from Removal, 30 J.L. & POL. 527, 
540–42 (2015) (explaining that when the statutory gap is reached each fiscal year, the 
government’s policy and practice is to hold decisions in abeyance until following years). 
 114. See INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no 
court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of relief 
under section 212(h), 212(i), 240A, 240B, or 245, or . . . any other decision or action of the 
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The upshot is that under current law, most convictions trigger some 
ground for deportation or other significant immigration consequences, even 
for long-term lawfully present noncitizens.115  Distinctions between types 
of convictions still matter, to be sure, because some removal grounds 
preclude any opportunity to have individual equities or considerations of 
justice balanced by an adjudicator and may trigger mandatory detention or 
permanent banishment.  Outside of the strict criteria described above, 
however, the INA no longer provides formal limitations on removal based 
on consideration of length of residence, contributions to society, the number 
and strength of relationships with U.S. citizen family members, health, or 
other equitable factors.116 
B.  Equitable Delegation 
Removing equitable discretion from the purview of judges does not 
necessarily excise it from the system.  As has long been recognized in the 
criminal law field, efforts to curtail adjudicative equitable consideration 
simply shift the locus of discretionary power to prosecutors and police.117  
Likewise, when Congress broadened grounds for removal and reduced the 
authority of immigration judges to set aside morally questionable 
deportations by narrowing the possibilities for the statutory exercise of 
discretion, it transferred authority over equitable discretion to the system’s 
other players.118  The effect was to directly increase the power of executive 
enforcement officials, who must determine how to prioritize the agency’s 
scarce resources through enforcement decisions. 
There are good reasons to think Congress favors, or at least has 
acquiesced in, a system in which the Executive is responsible for wielding 
equitable discretion through enforcement decisions.  First, Congress is well 
aware of the relationship between the breadth or severity of penal laws, the 
 
Attorney General the authority for which is specified under this title to be in the discretion of 
the Attorney General, other than the granting of relief under section 208(a) [asylum].”). 
 115. Minor convictions also affect eligibility for Temporary Protected Status, 
discretionary enforcement initiatives like DACA, and visa eligibility. See Cade, supra note 
58, at 1761–62. 
 116. “Registry,” a form relief from removal based on long and continuous presence in the 
United States, still exists on the books but is now practically available to very few persons. 
See INA § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (2012) (giving the Attorney General discretion to allow 
noncitizens who entered the United States. before January 1, 1972, have resided 
continuously since that time, have good moral character, and are not subject to various 
criminal bars, to adjust status to lawful permanent residence). 
 117. See Bowers, supra note 13, at 1687 (noting that “efforts to pretend away equitable 
discretion serve merely to channel it to the justice system’s least transparent actors 
(prosecutors)”); Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum:  Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise 
of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420 (2008) (discussing how mandatory sentencing guidelines 
transfer equitable power to prosecutors); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of 
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1522 (1981). 
 118. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 8, at 510–14 (observing that the size of the 
deportable population functionally gives the Executive much screening power to determine 
immigration priorities); Lee, supra note 96, at 572–77 (arguing that the immigration 
system’s reliance on criminal convictions transfers immigration screening power to criminal 
prosecutors). 
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restriction of judicial discretion, and the role of enforcement discretion.  
Congress “has created a system of criminal laws that requires—and has 
always required—the exercise of discretion.”119  Indeed, as Zachary Price’s 
recent research indicates, the acceptability of executive authority not to 
enforce fully Congress’s penal laws for reasons of justice or equity has 
roots reaching back to the early Republic.120  The proliferation and breadth 
of penal laws—the core of the modern “overcriminalization” 
phenomenon—suggests that legislatures regularly pass punitive codes they 
do not actually wish prosecutors or police to enforce fully.121  Moreover, 
federal legislators have explicitly acknowledged, in the context of enacting 
sentencing guidelines, that curbing judicial discretion “will not eliminate 
discretion, but merely shift the discretion to an earlier stage.”122 
In short, the widely recognized consequence of broadening grounds for 
penalties and narrowing adjudicative discretion is that law enforcement 
actors functionally are delegated tremendous power to determine the penal 
code’s actual priorities.123  Scholars have made similar insights about the 
administrative law system.124  Professors Adam Cox and Cristina 
Rodríguez, in particular, have thoughtfully examined the connection 
between the stringency of the modern immigration code and the rise of the 
President’s screening power through agency enforcement decisions.125 
Notably, when media accounts and other reports suggested that the 
former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) began 
indiscriminately enforcing the harsher statutory deportation provisions 
Congress enacted in 1996, many of the same legislators who had voted for 
 
 119. Stith, supra note 117, at 1422. 
 120. Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
671, 716–48 (2014); see also Stith, supra note 117, at 1422. 
 121. ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE 13 (2007) (“Legislatures pass laws 
criminalizing a vast array of behaviors, and some of these laws, such as fornication and 
adultery, for example, stay on the books long after social mores about these behaviors have 
changed.  In addition, some offenses warrant prosecution in some instances but not others.”); 
Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532, 
533 (1970); Stuntz, supra note 49, at 570–71 (“Legislators have good reason to criminalize 
more than they (or the public) would want punished . . . .”). 
 122. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform:  The Legislative 
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 263 (1993) 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-1017, at 35–36 (1984)). 
 123. Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1354 (2008); Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 746 (1996) (“[B]y creating too many policy 
choices, [legislatures] have effectively abdicated public policy-making to the prosecutor 
since it is the prosecutor, and not the legislature, that has the final decision in determining 
which public policy, if any, is breached by an individual’s conduct.”); Stuntz, supra note 49, 
at 519. 
 124. See, e.g., KATE M. MANUEL & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:  LEGAL ISSUES 8–10 (2013) 
(explaining that “both federal and state courts have ruled that the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion is an executive function necessary to the proper administration of justice”); 
MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY:  DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC 
SERVICES 29–39 (2010) (discussing the relationship between administrative discretion and 
the allocation of enforcement resources). 
 125. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 8, at 518–19. 
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the amendments wrote to the Attorney General expressing surprise and 
urging the agency to employ prosecutorial discretion more systematically in 
order to avoid “unjustifiable hardship.”126  The legislators’ letter cited 
examples of “unfair” deportations, including LPRs “who came to the 
United States when they were very young, and many years ago committed a 
single crime at the lower end of the ‘aggravated felony’ spectrum, but have 
been law-abiding ever since, obtained and held jobs and remained self-
sufficient, and started families in the United States.”127  The letter prompted 
the INS to issue its first comprehensive directive on the implementation of 
prosecutorial discretion.128 
Congress’s consent to the current system of prosecutorial-based equity 
may also be inferred for other reasons.  As previously noted, at present an 
estimated eleven million persons live in the United States without lawful 
immigration status.129  Additionally, the rise of the criminal history proxy 
made millions of lawfully present residents deportable on the basis of 
criminal convictions.  Immigration scholar Hiroshi Motomura has traced 
the political and historical factors that suggest longstanding congressional 
acquiescence in the large undocumented population, including nearly a 
century of economic reliance on Mexican migrants for cheap labor, 
facilitated in large part by failure to meaningfully enforce restrictions on 
both unlawful entry across the border or the employment of undocumented 
workers.130  Even as attitudes about undocumented workers specifically and 
immigration enforcement generally have become more stringent, 
Congress’s funding allocations to the Executive’s immigration agencies 
permit enforcement against only a very small fraction of both groups of 
deportable persons.  Indeed, the government frequently notes it has the 
resources only to remove a maximum of about 400,000 persons each 
year.131  Furthermore, these appropriations must be divided between 
interior and border removals.132  This underfunding strongly suggests that 
Congress depends on the Executive to set priorities in choosing which tiny 
fraction of the removable population to target.133  Indeed, statutory 
 
 126. Letter from Henry J. Hyde et al., Representatives, U.S. Cong., to Janet Reno, 
Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice & Doris M. Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration and 
Naturalization Serv. (Nov. 4, 1999), www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/ 
991104congress-letter.pdf. (signed by twenty-eight members of the House of 
Representatives) [http://perma.cc/B85V-GT6F]. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization 
Serv., to Reg’l Dirs., Dist. Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents & Reg’l & Dist. Counsel (Nov. 17, 
2000), http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Meissner-2000-memo. 
pdf [http://perma.cc/Y6H5-DPLR]. 
 129. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 130. MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 19–55; see also MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS:  
ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 93–95, 265–66 (2004). 
 131. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 132. See, e.g., SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 5 tbl.6 (showing breakdowns between interior 
and border enforcement for 2011 through 2013). 
 133. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 8, at 464 (“The President’s power to decide which 
and how many noncitizens should live in the United States operates principally at the back 
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provisions specifically delegate broad authority to the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to set “enforcement policies and priorities.”134 
It is also important to recognize that the statutory amendments elevating 
the role of criminal history in deportation law transferred immigration 
screening power to a different set of law enforcement actors.  Because the 
immigration code attaches immigration consequences to a large number of 
criminal offenses, local police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and 
sentencing judges wield wide-ranging influence over the pool of 
noncitizens deemed undesirable on the basis of criminal history.135  Arrest, 
prosecution, conviction, and sentencing often become definitive markers for 
purposes of deportation under current law.136  As Stephen Lee observes, 
“[B]y the time [noncitizens] reach removal proceedings, their best chance to 
avoid removal has already passed.”137 
State and federal prosecutors exert particular influence on downstream 
immigration consequences.138  They select the criminal charges to be filed, 
the plea deal to be offered, and the sentence to be recommended in the 
event of a plea agreement.  As is well known, nearly all prosecutions are 
resolved through plea agreements.139  Heidi Altman and others have argued 
that prosecutors’ ethical duty to see justice done encompasses making an 
effort to reach a plea deal that takes the proportionality of deportation into 
account.140  But criminal prosecutors can and do take very different 
 
end of the system, through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion with respect to whom to 
deport . . . .”). 
 134. 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (2012); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2012) (conferring broad 
power to the Secretary of Homeland Security over “the administration and enforcement of 
this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens”). 
 135. See generally Motomura, supra note 52 (explaining that local police can largely 
determine the pool of potential undesirable noncitizens through investigation and arrest 
practices). 
 136. The nature of the criminal conviction may also impact the likelihood of detention, 
the process afforded the noncitizen, the noncitizen’s ability to lawfully return to the United 
States in the future, and the severity of criminal sanctions in the event of an unlawful return. 
 137. Lee, supra note 96, at 556. 
 138. Further, the amplified possibility that immigration consequences will flow from a 
conviction may even increase a prosecutor’s power in criminal proceedings. See id. at 577. 
But see Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress’s Shadow, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 
1411, 1422–33 (2005) (predicting the growing shadow of immigration consequences will 
lead to more criminal trials). 
 139. See STATE UNIV. OF N.Y. AT ALBANY, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 
ONLINE, tbl.5.46.2004, www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5462004.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 
2015) (reporting that about ninety-five percent of criminal convictions result from pleas) 
[http://perma.cc/KJG4-RB8Z]; id. tbl.5.24.2009, www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5242009 
.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) (reporting that ninety-six percent of non-dismissed federal 
criminal cases during fiscal year 2009 ended with a guilty plea) [http://perma.cc/Z378-6938]. 
 140. See Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla:  State Interests and the Pursuit of 
Justice for Noncitizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1, 5–6 (2012) (arguing that professional 
responsibility standards and proportionality concerns do or will lead many prosecutors to 
individually evaluate the justifiability of deportation); Robert M.A. Johnson, A Prosecutor’s 
Expanded Responsibilities Under Padilla, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 129, 130 (2011) 
(arguing that Padilla will directly and indirectly influence prosecutors’ consideration of 
collateral consequences, presenting an opportunity to both do “justice and improve public 
safety”). 
2015] ENFORCING IMMIGRATION EQUITY 683 
approaches to this matter due to variations in office policies, local 
workloads, and beliefs about appropriate types of immigrants and levels of 
immigration.141 
In short, Congress has delegated primary power over implementation of 
immigration priorities to enforcement actors at the federal and local levels.  
Back-end adjudicators are reduced to a much-diminished role in 
immigration courts.  Thus, equity enters the deportation system, if at all, 
primarily through enforcement discretion.  These front-end actors have the 
power to consider whether deportation would be equitable in individual 
cases and to influence the downstream result through discretionary choices 
to forego prosecution or, if criminal proceedings are brought, through the 
negotiation over plea deals. 
II.  EQUITABLE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 
Thus far, this Article has explained that statutory amendments to the INA 
in the late twentieth century, along with underfunding of enforcement 
resources, functionally shifted equitable balancing in deportation cases to 
prosecutorial officials.  This part will show that the executive branch clearly 
recognizes—and seeks to protect—its role in keeping the deportation 
system normatively justifiable.  It also outlines the primary ways in which 
the current Administration has endeavored to implement equitable 
enforcement. 
A.  Acknowledgement of the Equitable Role 
The Obama Administration appears to understand, and to take seriously, 
its responsibility to ensure the deportation system operates equitably.  The 
Executive’s clearest acknowledgement—and most forceful defense—of this 
new institutional role came in the context of its preemption lawsuit against 
the state of Arizona.  In 2010, Arizona enacted the “Support Our Law 
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,” better known as SB 1070.142  
Before the law became effective, the federal government sued to enjoin four 
of its core provisions.143 
The first and most prominent of a number of similar state laws, SB 1070 
gave local law officers a significant role in federal immigration 
 
 141. See Altman, supra note 140, at 28–32 (presenting data on the range of attitudes in 
the Brooklyn District Attorney’s office regarding appropriateness of taking immigration 
consequences into account during plea bargaining); Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t 
Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1400–02 (2011) (arguing that, at least with respect 
to high-volume drug trafficking cases, “no amount of creative negotiation between well-
informed attorneys is likely to yield a disposition that avoids triggering automatic 
deportation”); Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry As Crime, Deportation As Punishment:  
Immigration Status and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417 (2011) (analyzing 
state criminal process laws that take immigration status into account in ways that sometimes 
disadvantage noncitizens); Eagly, supra note 54, at 1156–96 (discussing three prosecutors’ 
offices where alienage is variously treated as a neutral or negative factor). 
 142. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
 143. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012). 
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enforcement.144  By requiring only that local authorities act to enforce 
already existing federal immigration laws, the architects of these bills had 
hoped to withstand a preemption challenge.145  Their theory was premised 
on the fact that states commonly help enforce federal law.  Accordingly, 
proponents of such bills argued that state laws that “mirror” federal 
prohibitions should not run afoul of the Supremacy Clause.146  In Arizona v. 
United States,147 however, the Court upheld a preliminary injunction 
against three of the four challenged statutory provisions.148 
For present purposes, the most interesting aspect of this litigation is the 
extent to which the federal government grounded its preemption arguments 
in the need to preserve its ability to exercise equitable discretion without 
interference from states.  The Government argued that it must be able to 
make discretionary nonenforcement choices, free from interference by state 
law enforcement officers, whose actions pursuant to SB 1070 might unduly 
burden noncitizens or exert exogenous influence on federal deportation 
priorities. 
Describing the institutional scheme in general, the government’s main 
brief to the Supreme Court observed that “Congress vested the Executive 
Branch with the authority and the discretion to make sensitive judgments 
with respect to aliens, balancing the numerous considerations involved,” 
which include “national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, [and] 
humanitarian considerations . . . .”149  The Administration pressed the point 
that an uninvited state role poses a hazard to discretionary nonenforcement 
decisions.  Discussing SB 1070’s imposition of penalties for noncitizens 
 
 144. States to follow Arizona with similar laws include Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South 
Carolina, and Utah. See MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 64. 
 145. The principal drafter of SB 1070 and other laws targeting undocumented noncitizens 
was Kris Kobach, the current Kansas Secretary of State.  Kobach was the chief immigration 
advisor to former Attorney General John Ashcroft and had a temporary stint as a law 
professor at the University of Missouri-Kansas City before his current position. See Anna 
Gorman, A Voice for Tough Immigration Laws, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 2010, at A1; John 
Hanna, Kan. Lawyer is Architect of Many Immigration Laws, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (May 
10, 2010, 11:38 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2010/may/10/kan-
lawyer-is-architect-of-many-immigration-laws/ [http://perma.cc/2DT7-AHVU]. 
 146. See Adam Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012 
SUP. CT. REV. 31, 31 (“Enforcement redundancy, as we might call it, is the norm.”); id. at 
34–43; David A. Martin, Reading Arizona, 98 VA. L. REV.:  IN BRIEF 41, 42 (2012) 
(“Arizona argued that its law is different, because it simply mirrors the federal obligation, 
punishing only those who could be punished by federal authorities . . . .”); see also Ernest A. 
Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”:  The Presumption Against Preemption in the 
Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253.  The “mirror image” theory appeared to carry some 
weight in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011), in which a 
divided Court upheld a different Arizona law requiring employers to use a federal database 
to check all employees’ work authorizations, even though federal law does not make the 
verification system mandatory.  Ultimately, however, what mattered most to the majority in 
Whiting was that the federal law at issue, while expressly preempting state employer 
sanctions, contained an explicit carve-out allowing states to use “licensing and similar laws” 
to penalize employers who unlawfully hire undocumented workers. Id. 
 147. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 148. Id. at 2507–10. 
 149. Brief for the United States at 14, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182) (emphasis 
added). 
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who have not complied with the federal registration requirement, for 
example, the Government argued that  
[t]he State cannot, in the name of enforcing a federal registration 
obligation that runs between individual aliens and the National 
Government, claim the right to punish aliens who are not registered but 
who the Executive Branch has decided not to prosecute based on 
important considerations consistent with the INA.150 
Throughout its briefs, the Government continued in a similar vein, 
arguing that uninvited state enforcement of federal immigration laws 
threatens federal authority to “justly administer[]” the law, including 
through discretionary authority to consider “humanitarian” or similar 
factors when deciding whether to remove or detain deportable 
noncitizens.151  At oral argument, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli 
likewise reiterated at many points the potential conflict between a federal 
decision not to enforce the law against a particular noncitizen and the state’s 
arrest and prosecution of that noncitizen for federal immigration 
violations.152 
It is important to recognize that by pressing the need to protect 
discretionary nonenforcement so concretely, the Government also conveyed 
its belief that this understanding of the removal system’s institutional 
design should warrant constitutional protection.  Despite the unusual nature 
of this preemption argument,153 the Court appears to have agreed.  The 
majority’s analysis in the Arizona case frequently connects its preemption 
rulings to its perception that the Executive’s control over enforcement 
decisions is critical to the implementation of equity in the removal 
system.154 
Public statements also reflect the Administration’s awareness of the 
connection between enforcement discretion and equity in the removal 
system.  Regarding DACA, for example, President Obama has stressed that 
DHS’s consideration of nonenforcement discretion for noncitizens meeting 
the criteria is about keeping immigration enforcement “humane” and 
making equitable distinctions regarding how best to use the agency’s 
 
 150. Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
 151. Id. at 15, 18–19, 22, 25, 31–33, 48–50, 53–54; Brief for the United States in 
Opposition at 25–28, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182). 
 152. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, 38, 41, 43, 45, 49, 57–58, 70–71, Arizona, 132 S. 
Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182). 
 153. See Cox, supra note 146, at 33 (arguing that allowing executive nonenforcement 
discretion to displace state law represents “a radical departure from conventional approaches 
to preemption”); David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism:  A Return to Form, 8 
DUKE J. OF CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 87 (2013) (“[N]onbinding executive enforcement 
policies cannot, and should not, preempt subfederal law.”). 
 154. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499 (“A principal feature of the removal system is the 
broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.” (emphasis added)); id. at 2502–06. See 
generally Cade, supra note 51 (arguing that the Court has taken a number of opportunities in 
recent years to structurally preserve possibilities for equitable balancing in the enforcement 
of immigration law). 
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limited enforcement resources.155  The Administration frequently 
characterizes DACA as “the right thing to do” and as in line with “our 
values as a nation.”156  In former Secretary of Homeland Security Janet 
Napolitano’s words, “Our nation’s immigration laws must be enforced in a 
firm and sensible manner.  But they are not designed to be blindly enforced 
without consideration given to the individual circumstances of each 
case.”157 
Similarly, when announcing new prosecutorial discretion initiatives in 
late 2014, President Obama stated that they “will help make our 
immigration system more fair and more just.”158  Internal agency memos 
also acknowledge the critical link between prosecutorial discretion and the 
“fairness of the removal process.”159 
 
 155. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012), 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration (arguing 
that DACA will make the immigration system “more fair, more efficient, and more just”) 
[http://perma.cc/7S66-PAUR]. 
 156. See, e.g., Jay Carney, White House Press Sec’y, Statement on the First Anniversary 
of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process (June 15, 2013), www.whitehouse.gov 
/the-press-office/2013/06/15/statement-press-secretary-first-anniversary-deferred-action-
childhood-ar (“A year ago today, the Administration took up the cause of ‘Dreamers’ and 
took action to make our immigration system more representative of our values as a nation.”) 
[http://perma.cc/7KXR-KG7W]; Jay Carney, White House Press Sec’y, Press Briefing (June 
21, 2012), www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/21/press-briefing-press-secretary-
jay-carney-62112 (stating that immigration prosecutorial discretion is aimed at “ensuring 
that we are enforcing the law in a way that makes the right decisions in terms of priorities, 
and does not unfairly and unnecessarily punish people”) [http://perma.cc/8BD2-HSVE]; 
Press Release, Jeh Johnson, U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., Secretary Johnson Announces 
Process for DACA Renewal (June 5, 2014), www.uscis.gov/news/secretary-johnson-
announces-process-daca-renewal (“By the renewal of DACA, we act in accord with our 
values and the code of this great Nation.”) [http://perma.cc/SX33-X53T]; Obama, supra note 
155 (repeatedly describing DACA as “the right thing to do”); see also Transcript:  President 
Obama’s Full NPR Interview, NPR (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/12/ 
29/372485968/transcript-president-obamas-full-npr-interview (“If your view is that 
immigrants are either fundamentally bad to the country or that we actually have the option of 
deporting 11 million immigrants, regardless of the disruptions, regardless of the cost, and 
that that is who we are as Americans, I reject that.”) [http://perma.cc/6W8M-8DG6]. 
 157. Press Release, Janet Napolitano, U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., (June 15, 2012), 
www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/15/secretary-napolitano-announces-deferred-action-process-
young-people-who-are-low [http://perma.cc/84UZ-MD7N]. 
 158. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (Nov. 25, 2014), 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/25/remarks-president-immigration-chicago-il 
(“[T]here have been times where families got broken apart—while I’ve been President.  And 
it’s heartbreaking.  That’s not right.”) [http://perma.cc/K5UV-MYMG]; see also Senator 
Charles Schumer, Attorney General Confirmation Hearing, Day 1, Part 1, C-SPAN (Jan. 28, 
2015), www.c-span.org/video/?323993-1/us-attorney-general-nominee-confirmation-hearing 
(“Doesn’t it make sense to have a general rule . . . in an office with limited resources to go 
after bank robbers before you go after shoplifters?”) [http://perma.cc/Y5V3-DJMU]; 
Appellant’s Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 2, Texas v. United States, 787 
F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-40238) (“In short, the preliminary injunction is a sweeping 
order that extends beyond the parties before the court and irreparably harms the Government 
and the public interest by preventing DHS from marshalling its resources to protect border 
security, public safety and national security, while also addressing humanitarian interests.”). 
 159. Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enf’t, to All Office of the Principal Legal Advisor Chief Counsel 8 (Oct. 24, 
2005), http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/reference/additional-materials/immigration/ 
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B.  Implementation 
This section outlines three ways that the current Administration has 
endeavored to implement equitable immigration enforcement:  distribution 
of resources to high priority targets, more systematic prosecutorial 
discretion in individual cases, and initiatives that allow noncitizens meeting 
particular criteria to affirmatively apply for a temporary deferral of 
removal. 
1.  Shifting Resources 
Targeted resource distribution can work as a means of increasing the 
likelihood of equitable enforcement.  Whereas the immigration agencies 
under President George W. Bush focused on workplace and home raids,160 
the current Administration has directed most of its enforcement resources 
toward the apprehension and removal of recent or repeat immigration 
violators and noncitizens with criminal history, in keeping with the 
agency’s expressed enforcement priorities.161  While not all deportations of 
noncitizens in these groups will be justifiable, targeted resource choices 
lessen the probability of enforcement against individuals in non-targeted 
groups, whom the government reasonably may believe are most likely to 
present significant equitable claims. 
Agency data show that over the last decade, and particularly in the last 
few years, the percentage of total removals deemed “border removals” has 
dramatically increased.162  In 2011, for example, there were 387,134 total 




(“Prosecutorial discretion is a very significant tool that sometimes enables you to deal with 
the difficult, complex and contradictory provisions of the immigration laws and cases 
involving human suffering and hardship.”) [http://perma.cc/6WVK-BDZ7]; see also 
Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski et 
al., Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants 
(Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson Policies Memo], http://www.dhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
47CA-UYQG]; Morton Priorities Memo, supra note 12; Memorandum from John Morton, 
Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, to Field Office Dirs., Special Agents in Charge & 
Chief Counsel, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration 
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention & Removal of Aliens 
4–5 (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Discretion Memo], http://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf [http://perma.cc/293E-
CVA8]. 
 160. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 8, at 511–21. 
 161. See, e.g., Johnson Policies Memo, supra note 159, at 1; Morton Priorities Memo, 
supra note 12, at 1–3; Morton Discretion Memo, supra note 159, at 4–5. 
 162. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL REPORT:  IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIONS:  2010 4, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar-
2010.pdf (setting forth data on expedited and reinstated removal proceedings from 2001 to 
2010) [http://perma.cc/2KFE-J5KW]; SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 5–6 (setting forth data on 
expedited and reinstated removal proceedings from 2011 to 2013). 
 163. SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 6. 
 164. Alex Nowrasteh,Updates on President Obama’s Immigration Enforcement Record, 
CATO INST. (Oct. 17, 2014, 10:48 AM), http://www.cato.org/blog/updates-president-obamas-
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2012, there were 418,397 total removals,165 of which 61 percent were 
border removals and 39 percent were interior removals.166  As a portion of 
the record-setting 438,421 total removals in 2013,167 border removals 
climbed to 70 percent.168  These numbers show a clear trend toward 
increased emphasis on removals at the border.  Unsurprisingly, then, in 
recent years over 20 percent of DHS’s total budget has gone to the Customs 
and Border Patrol (CBP)—twice the amount apportioned to ICE.169  
Furthermore, in November 2014, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson indicated that 
the DHS will direct even more resources to the border in the future.170 
Prioritizing border enforcement recognizes that, generally speaking, 
noncitizens who have already been living inside the United States are more 
likely to have developed ties and relationships that militate against removal.  
While not all noncitizens already living in the U.S. interior will have a 
strong normative claim to remain despite clear deportability, many will 
have developed connections that at least should be considered.  By focusing 
a significant percentage of its enforcement resources on recent immigration 
violators, the current Administration takes what might be considered a 
probabilistic approach to equitable deportations. 
 
immigration-enforcement-record-0 (noting that 51 percent of removals in FY 2011 were 
border removals, while 48 percent were deemed interior removals) [http://perma.cc/U7ST-
BK5C]; see also SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 3, 5, 7 (noting that in FY 2011, CBP was 
responsible for 50.1 percent of all Apprehensions, 18.8 percent of all Removals, and 76.1 
percent of all Returns). 
 165. SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 6. 
 166. Nowrasteh, supra note 164; see also SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 3, 5, 6 (noting that 
in FY 2012, CBP was responsible for 54.3 percent of all Apprehensions, 17.4 percent of all 
Removals, and 72.8 percent of all Returns). 
 167. SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 6. 
 168. Nowrasteh, supra note 164 (noting that approximately 70 percent of Removals in FY 
2013 were border removals, while approximately 30 percent were deemed interior 
removals); see also SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 5, 6 (noting that in FY 2013, CPB was 
responsible for 63.5 percent of all Apprehensions, 24.6 percent of all Removals, and 80.2 
percent of all Returns). 
 169. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 2016 9 (2015), 
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY_2016_DHS_Budget_in_Brief.pdf (noting 
that for FY 2016, 21 percent of DHS’s total budget of $64,858,484,000 is to be allocated to 
CBP, while 10 percent will go to ICE and 6 percent to USCIS) [http://perma.cc/VHX5-
K2TQ]; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 2015 5 (2014), 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY15BIB.pdf (noting that for FY 2015, 
21 percent of DHS’s total budget of $60,918,787,000 was allocated to CBP, while 9 percent 
went to ICE and 5 percent to USCIS) [http://perma.cc/XN6S-CBDA]; DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC, BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 2014 5 (2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/MGMT/FY%202014%20BIB%20-%20FINAL%20-508%20Formatted%20%2 
84%29.pdf (noting that for FY 2014, 22 percent of DHS’s total budget of $59,959,337,000 
was allocated to CBP, while 9 percent went to ICE and 5 percent to USCIS) 
[http://perma.cc/3VHA-STBC]; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC, BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 
2013 23 (2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-budget-in-brief-fy2013.pdf 
(noting that in FY 2013, 21 percent of DHS’s total budget of $59,032,346,000 was allocated 
to CBP, while 10 percent went to ICE and 5 percent to USCIS) [http://perma.cc/6GT7-
TMBE]. 
 170. See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to R. Gil 
Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al., Southern Border and 
Approaches Campaign (Nov. 20, 2014). 
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With respect to interior removals, the Obama Administration has 
committed itself to the detection, apprehension, and removal of noncitizens 
who encounter criminal justice systems.171  The immigration agency 
currently operates multiple enforcement initiatives to identify noncitizens 
who encounter state and local criminal justice systems.  The most important 
are the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) (formerly known as Secure 
Communities), the Criminal Alien Program (CAP), and the so-called 
“287(g) programs.”  Since 2008, federal funding for these interior 
enforcement programs has far exceeded half a billion dollars per year.172 
The largest and most integrated program is PEP.173  PEP ensures that 
when local police submit arrestees’ fingerprints to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation to check for criminal background and outstanding warrants, 
the prints automatically get forwarded to DHS to facilitate identification of 
persons who might be deportable.174  Although DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson 
announced in November 2014 that certain aspects of PEP would be 
retooled, along with dropping the program’s former name, its key feature of 
screening every arrested noncitizen for potential enforcement remains in 
place in almost every jurisdiction in the country.175 
Meanwhile, CAP’s 8000 officers supplement PEP by checking inmate 
roster data provided by correctional departments against immigration 
databases.176  These officers also use in-person and virtual interviews to 
detect deportable foreign-born detainees in prisons and jails throughout the 
country.177  Similarly, section 287(g) agreements deputize local criminal 
 
 171. See, e.g., Sam Dolnick, In Change, Mayor Backs Obstacle to Deportation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at A19 (“[T]he Obama administration has placed a priority on deporting 
noncitizen criminals who pose a threat to the public, while focusing less on illegal 
immigrants who do not pose a threat.”); Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More 
Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2014, at A1 (quoting 
President Obama as saying that immigration authorities are going after “criminals, gang 
bangers, people who are hurting the community, not after students, not after folks who are 
here just because they’re trying to figure out how to feed their families”); Press Release, 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano’s Remarks on Smart Effective Border 
Security & Immigration Enforcement (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/10/ 
05/secretary-napolitanos-remarks-smart-effective-border-security-and-immigration (“We 
established, as a top priority, the identification and removal of public safety and national 
security threats.  To execute on this, we expanded the use and frequency of investigations 
and programs, like Secure Communities, that track down criminals and gang members on 
our streets and in our jails.”) [http://perma.cc/P7RG-5RE6]. 
 172. See MARC R. ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INTERIOR 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:  PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS 24 (2013). 
 173. See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., Secure 
Communities (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson Secure Communities Memo]; Cade, 
supra note 58, at 1764–66 (describing the relative size and integration of the Secure 
Communities Program, PEP’s predecessor). 
 174. See ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 172, at 15 (discussing the program when it 
was still called Secure Communities). 
 175. Johnson Secure Communities Memo, supra note 173 (explaining that the program 
formerly known as Secure Communities will remain in place but with a new name and 
modifications such as eliminating the detainer program). 
 176. ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 172, at 14–15. 
 177. Id. at 14; see also Declaration of Jamison Matuszewski ¶¶ 18–22, at 6–8, Am. 
Immigration Council v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 12-00355 (D. Conn. July 12, 2012). 
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justice officials to interview and screen foreign-born inmates or detainees 
using the same immigration databases as those checked by federal CAP 
officers.178  In recent years, the use of 287(g) programs has declined, as 
other programs have grown in importance.  Even so, as of August 2015, 
ICE has thirty-two 287(g) agreements in place in sixteen states.179 
Together, PEP, CAP, and 287(g) programs allow federal immigration 
officials to screen virtually every inmate in every jail or prison in the 
country.  Furthermore, a number of states and localities have enacted 
legislation authorizing or mandating local law enforcement’s participation 
in the deportation scheme.180  DHS is obligated to “respond to an inquiry by 
a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain 
the citizenship or immigration status” of any person, and the agency 
accordingly maintains a Law Enforcement Support Center that fields calls 
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, from any law enforcement 
officer.181 
If a noncitizen who is identified through one or more of these federal (or 
state) programs appears to fall within an enforcement priority, ICE makes a 
discretionary decision whether to initiate removal proceedings.182  
Immigration enforcement priorities are somewhat variable, but generally 
include prior criminal records, immigration violations, or the seriousness of 
an arrest charge.183  However, no federal law or policy constrains ICE 
officers from initiating proceedings in cases against noncitizens believed to 
be deportable where such negative factors are absent.184 
These programs have been highly successful at channeling noncitizens 
who encounter the criminal justice system into removal proceedings.  Not 
only are the total removal numbers under President Obama the highest in 
history,185 but a higher percentage of those deportees are “criminal 
 
 178. ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 172, at 16. 
 179. See Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and 
Nationality Act, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.:  U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/8ASW-
GAUQ]. 
 180. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 31-13-6 (Supp. 2012); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051 (2012); 
Ga. Code Ann. § 17-5-100(b) (2013); Ind. Code Ann. § 5-2-18.2-4 (LexisNexis 2013); S.C. 
Code Ann. § 17-13-170 (Supp. 2012); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-100 to -109 (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2013). 
 181. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2012). 
 182. Cade, supra note 58, at 1763–66; Motomura, supra note 52. 
 183. See Johnson Policies Memo, supra note 159, at 3–4; Morton Priorities Memo, supra 
note 12, at 3. 
 184. But see Juliet P. Stumpf, D(e)volving Discretion:  Lessons from the Life and Times 
of Secure Communities, 64 AM. U.L. REV. 1259 (2015) (arguing that the PEP memo’s 
requirement that rank-and-file officers obtain permission from supervisors to go outside of 
the priorities may provide such a constraint). 
 185. See Barack Obama, Deporter-in-Chief, ECONOMIST (Feb. 8, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21595902/ (“America is expelling illegal immigrants at 
nine times the rate of 20 years ago; nearly [two million] so far under Barack Obama, easily 
outpacing any previous president.”) [http://perma.cc/R6RZ-8NFZ].  From 1892 to 2007, the 
U.S. government deported about two million individuals in total—a figure that has been 
doubled in the past seven years. Elise Foley, Obama Deportation Toll Could Pass 2 Million 
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aliens.”186  To put the current regime in perspective, consider that between 
1908 and 1980, the United States deported only 56,669 criminal aliens, out 
of 812,915 total deportations during that seventy-three year period.187  
From 1991 to 1996, criminal alien removals saw a substantial increase, 
numbering 134,705 criminal removals out of 284,803 total over that 
period.188  While the agency under President George W. Bush’s two terms 
saw steady increases in criminal removal,189 under President Obama’s 
Administration the number skyrocketed.  In recent years, the deportation of 
noncitizens with criminal history averages almost 200,000 out of a total of 
approximately 400,000 removals each year.190 
Notably, these numbers do not distinguish by severity of crime.  Closer 
scrutiny of criminal alien removals shows that traffic offenses, crimes of 
migration (illegal entry or reentry), and low-level drug possession make up 
the vast majority of deportations of persons the agency deems criminal.191  
Indeed, removals based on traffic convictions have increased ten-fold in the 
past ten years, accounting for approximately 30 percent of the increased 
“criminal alien” removals.192  Nevertheless, by focusing interior 
enforcement efforts on apprehending noncitizens following convictions or 
other encounters with the criminal justice system, the Administration has 
increased the likelihood that those put into the removal system will have 
negative factors that potentially justify their deportation. 
2.  Case-By-Case Discretion 
While prosecutorial discretion guidance has been in place since the 
1970s,193 recent policy leaders have established more detailed and 
transparent enforcement priorities, with the ostensible goal of concentrating 
 
at Current Rates, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2013/01/31/obama-deportation_n_2594012.html [http://perma.cc/P3P7-CNEB]. 
 186. See supra note 24 (describing DHS’s definition of “criminal aliens”). 
 187. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL 
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 187 tbl.67, http://www.dhs. 
gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/1997YB.pdf (indicating that between 1908 and 1980, 
48,330 noncitizens were deported for “criminal violations” and another 8339 were deported 
for “narcotics violations”) [http://perma.cc/94VP-PN8G]. 
 188. Id. at 178 tbl.63. 
 189. During President Clinton’s second term and President Bush’s two terms, total 
criminal removals rose significantly each year, but actually shrank as a percentage of total 
removals, as noncriminal removals skyrocketed, especially under President Bush. See 
generally MARC R. ROSENBLUM & DORIS MEISSNER, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE 
DEPORTATION DILEMMA:  RECONCILING TOUGH AND HUMANE ENFORCEMENT 38–39 fig.13 
(2014) (discussing removal data from DHS between 1993 and 2012). 
 190. See SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 6 tbl.8 (showing 198,394 criminal removals out of 
438,421 total removals in FY 2013; 200,143 criminal removals out of 418,397 total in FY 
2012; and 188,964 criminal removals out of 387,134 total in FY 2011). 
 191. Id.; MARC R. ROSENBLUM & KRISTEN MCCABE, MIGRATION POLICY INST., 
DEPORTATION AND DISCRETION:  REVIEWING THE RECORD AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 20 
(2014); Eagly, supra note 54, at 1218; Eisha Jain, Arrests As Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 
809, 833 (2015). 
 192. Eagly, supra note 54, at 1218. 
 193. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration 
Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 246 (2010); Wildes, supra note 50. 
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DHS’s limited enforcement resources on the most important targets.194  In 
2011, then-ICE Director John Morton began rolling out a high-profile 
initiative to encourage a more systematic use of prosecutorial discretion 
throughout the agency.195  Over the next year, agency leaders issued a 
series of memoranda setting forth positive and negative factors to be 
balanced in the exercise of discretion, designating categories of persons 
warranting special consideration and providing for scenario-based training 
programs.196  Although the agency has tinkered with the language of the 
enforcement priorities over time, the consistent focus is on noncitizens with 
criminal records or indicia of a threat to public safety, as well as those who 
have recently or egregiously violated the immigration laws.197 
These memos establish that noncitizens who do not fall within a priority 
for removal should be considered for prosecutorial discretion.  The 
guidelines for discretion are typically in the form of nonexhaustive lists of 
positive and negative considerations, including “the person’s ties and 
contributions to the community, including family relationships,”198 the 
severity and recentness of any convictions, and “compelling humanitarian 
factors such as poor health, age, pregnancy, a young child, or a seriously ill 
relative.”199 
These enforcement discretion guidelines directly hone in on 
considerations of proportionality and personal mitigation.  In so doing, they 
attempt to compensate for an immigration system in which grounds for 
 
 194. See, e.g., Johnson Policies Memo, supra note 159 (establishing “new policies for the 
apprehension, detention, and removal of aliens in this country”); Morton Priorities Memo, 
supra note 12 (stating the agency’s tiered removal priorities). 
 195. See Morton Discretion Memo, supra note 159, at 1. 
 196. See id.; Memorandum from Peter S. Vincent to All Chief Counsel, Office of the 
Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t 2 (Nov. 17, 2011); U.S. 
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, NEXT STEPS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION MEMORANDUM AND THE AUGUST 18TH ANNOUNCEMENT ON 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/ 
pros-discretion-next-steps.pdf [http://perma.cc/8P7D-AMQ9]. 
 197. See, e.g., Johnson Policies Memo, supra note 159, at 3–4; Morton Priorities Memo, 
supra note 12, at 1–3. 
 198. Morton Discretion Memo, supra note 159, at 4 (“When weighing whether an 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion may be warranted for a given alien, ICE officers, agents, 
and attorneys should consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to . . . the 
person’s ties and contributions to the community, including family relationships.”). 
 199. Johnson Policies Memo, supra note 159, at 5–6 (“DHS personnel should consider 
factors such as:  . . . extended length of time since the offense of conviction; length of time in 
the United States; military service; family or community ties in the United States; status as a 
victim, witness or plaintiff in civil or criminal proceedings; or compelling humanitarian 
factors such as poor health, age, pregnancy, a young child, or a seriously ill relative.”); 
Morton Priorities Memo, supra note 12; see also Memorandum from Gary Mead, Exec. 
Assoc. Dir., Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor & James Dinkins, Exec. Assoc. Dir., 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, to All Field Office Dirs., Chief Counsel & Special 
Agents in Charge, Applicability of Prosecutorial Discretion Memoranda to Certain Family 
Relationships (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.washingtonblade.com/content/files/2012/10/9-Oct-
12-PD-and-Family-Reltionships.pdf. [http://perma.cc/3JYE-SMYR]; Memorandum from 
John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, to All Employees (June 15, 2012), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/s1-certain-young-people-morton.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/BV7U-YML9]. 
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removal sweep broadly and retroactively, opportunities to lawfully adjust 
status are tightly constrained, and immigration judges have little power to 
set aside deportation on equitable grounds. 
However, it remains unclear whether the prosecutorial discretion 
guidelines will meaningfully impact the equity of the removal system.  
From the outset, large factions of the agency’s rank and file have railed 
against the initiative.200  In 2012, a group of ICE officers, represented by 
Kris Kobach,201 sued their own agency, arguing that requiring them to 
consider prosecutorial discretion forced them “to break the law.”202  The 
lead plaintiff in the lawsuit was Chris Crane, the president of the National 
ICE Council, which represents a union of ICE officers.203  Although the 
lawsuit was eventually dismissed, the ICE union refused to allow its 7700 
members to engage in any agency training on the use of prosecutorial 
discretion.204  Crane’s public remarks reveal the narrow view of many ICE 
agents regarding the use of arrest and charging discretion as a means of 
implementing equity in the deportation system:  “[C]harge (the suspect) as 
being in the United States illegally and let the judge sort it out. . . .  That’s 
our place in the universe. . . .  We’re supposed to make arrests and let the 
judges and the legal system sort through the details.”205 
The agency’s trial attorneys seem to have haphazardly followed the 
prosecutorial discretion initiative.  Between October 2012 and August 2014, 
ICE prosecutors closed a total of 38,439 removal cases in the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion following Director Morton’s guidelines.206  To be 
sure, that represents a significant increase in the number of closures based, 
ostensibly, on equitable considerations.  However, as a percentage of the 
total cases pending in immigration court, these closures are only a tiny drop 
in the bucket.  Nationwide, since 2008, the number of persons facing formal 
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removal proceedings has dramatically climbed each year, reaching more 
than 400,000 in both 2014 and 2015 (more than double the number of 
pending cases under any prior administration).207 
More critically, as I have shown elsewhere, the use of prosecutorial 
discretion by ICE attorneys varies wildly throughout the country, with just 
five out of approximately eighty immigration court jurisdictions 
representing more than half of all case closures tracked since October 
2012.208  Similarly situated jurisdictions have dramatically different 
discretionary closure rates.209  There is also anecdotal evidence that, even 
when administrative closure is offered, many ICE attorneys do so “not to 
buffer overly harsh applications of immigration law in low-priority cases, 
but rather to avoid having to litigate hearings when the noncitizen may be 
eligible for more far-reaching relief.”210  To the extent this is the case, 
prosecutorial discretion closures may be less about compensating for 
equitable deficiencies in the removal system and more about reducing 
government attorney workload, or, even more cynically, bargaining risk-
averse noncitizens who have strong equitable claims down to unfavorable 
results.211 
3.  Categorical Discretion (DACA and DAPA) 
President Obama’s announcement of DACA in 2012 represented a shift 
toward more systematic and categorical implementation of enforcement 
discretion.212  Unlike the reactive, case-by-case evaluation that the Morton 
initiative asked ICE officers and attorneys to undertake, DACA allows 
individuals meeting specified criteria to announce themselves to a 
government unit within the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) for a more targeted consideration of their eligibility for equitable 
balancing.213  If favorable action is warranted, DACA applicants receive 
“deferred action,” which amounts to a revocable assurance that they are not 
going to be a priority for deportation for at least two years.214  Although 
deferred action confers only legal presence (not legal status), by preexisting 
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regulation deferred action recipients are eligible to apply for work 
authorization if they can demonstrate economic necessity.215 
The newer deferred-action initiatives announced in late 2014 would 
operate in similar fashion.216  If implemented, DAPA would allow certain 
parents of a U.S. citizen or LPR to affirmatively request consideration for 
favorable discretion by the USCIS special unit.217  The 2014 
pronouncement also expands DACA to authorize discretionary 
consideration for a larger group of childhood arrivals.218  For now, 
however, a federal judge has enjoined DAPA and the expanded DACA, and 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently rejected the federal 
government’s bid for a stay of that preliminary injunction.219  The litigation 
will likely reach the Supreme Court.  If that injunction does not become 
permanent, several million unlawfully present noncitizens may be eligible 
to seek a temporary, discretionary reprieve from removal.220  Based on 
application numbers in the DACA program since 2012, the number of 
noncitizens who actually seek deferred action is likely to be much smaller 
than stated estimates.221  Even so, these recent steps illustrate the primacy 
of enforcement-level decision making in our present-day immigration 
system. 
Despite its seemingly categorical nature, DACA incorporates key 
features that are reflective of prosecutorial discretion.  Most important, 
agency officers who implement the program must first ensure the equitable 
criteria justifying deferral are present and then must assess the totality of the 
noncitizen’s circumstances on a case-by-case basis.  USCIS weighs relevant 
negative factors, such as suspected gang membership, repeated arrests (even 
without conviction), document fraud, and so on, against the positive 
equities when determining whether to defer removal.222  According to 
agency data, as of December 31, 2014, the agency had accepted as properly 
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filed 727,164 out of 770,338 initial requests for deferred action under the 
original DACA initiative.223  Of those properly filed requests, 638,897 were 
granted deferred action, while 38,597 were denied because of failure to 
establish threshold criteria or the presence of negative discretionary 
factors.224  As of December 31, 2014, 49,670 initial requests remain 
pending.225 
To be sure, this is a high approval rate.  But that is to be expected in a 
program that asks deportable noncitizens essentially to turn themselves in 
for removal unless they can prove significant positive equities.  Because the 
application process for DACA entails the submission of biometric data and 
identity documents, background checks, and documentary proof, there is a 
“powerful deterrent against individuals with marginal applications from 
applying in the first place.”226  Even eligible youth with strong cases may 
decline to apply for fear that a later administration would reverse course and 
use the data collected to identify and seek to remove them.227 
Furthermore, the nature of the equitable criteria required to qualify for 
DACA—long residence in the United States, earning or demonstrated 
progress toward a high school diploma or equivalent, no criminal record, 
being brought to the United States at a young age, et cetera—bring the 
current deportation system’s potential for disproportionality into sharp 
relief.228  The underlying offense triggering the sanction of deportation (and 
a ten year bar on lawful reentry) is noncitizens’ presence in the United 
States without authorization, and, in some cases, unlawful entry.  Their 
personal mitigating factors point toward lack of (or significantly 
diminished) culpability, full acculturation as Americans, strong community 
ties, high potential for economic productivity, respect for penal laws, lack 
of indications of dangerousness, and so on.229  For youth falling within this 
group, then, concerns about equity loom especially large and discretionary 
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nonenforcement can be defensibly applied in a more generalized fashion.  
Indeed, categorical proportionality assessment is no stranger to the law.230  
In a system lacking back-end proportionality review, the executive agency 
charged with enforcing immigration law might reasonably determine that 
deporting DACA-eligible persons (or at least those whose cases lack other 
indicia suggesting undesirability) is by definition going to be categorically 
inequitable.231  To the extent this is accurate, however, it suggests that 
DACA cannot justifiably be limited to a one-time program. 
That DACA and DAPA bifurcate agency enforcement discretion is also 
notable.  While ICE prosecutors and agents remain free to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion (or not), in this model another set of institutional 
actors, housed within a different subagency of DHS, are tasked to look 
closely at particular categories of cases that are highly likely to involve 
persuasive equitable factors.  This institutional design carries with it at least 
three significant benefits. 
First, by publishing the guidelines and process for allowing deportable 
noncitizens to present themselves for consideration of deferred action, the 
administration promotes transparency and consistency, two rule of law 
values that are often raised as concerns when it comes to agency actions in 
general and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in particular.232  Second, 
placing responsibility in a unit specifically trained to screen for equities 
promotes efficiency gains.233  ICE attorneys are overburdened with too 
many removal cases, and there are too few incentives for them to look 
closely at any case until shortly before a merits hearing—which is likely to 
come nearly two years after the initiation of proceedings, if the noncitizen 
can persevere that long.234  Finally, sharing discretionary duties between 
two agency bodies adds an extra equitable screen, thereby decreasing the 
likelihood that noncitizens with significant humanitarian factors will be 
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unjustifiably deported.235  Thus, the deferred action programs move beyond 
“plenary” delegation of discretionary authority to street-level officers by 
clarifying priorities and establishing a layered, transparent agency 
framework for administering certain discretionary decisions.236 
In short, DACA and DAPA represent the Administration’s most 
ambitious attempt yet to manage the equitable responsibility delegated to it 
by Congress.  Noncitizens who meet the criteria for these programs—law-
abiding and productive childhood arrivals or parents of U.S. citizens or 
LPRs—are likely to be among the portion of the deportable population 
presenting the greatest normative challenge to the operation of the removal 
system.237  As the next part explains, however, reliance on executive 
discretion alone to ensure that the deportation system remains equitable is 
likely to come up short. 
III.  THE DRAWBACKS AND LIMITS OF EQUITY IN ENFORCEMENT 
The executive branch has accumulated vast power over the ground-level 
realities of modern deportation law through the establishment of 
enforcement priorities and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  As 
shown in Part II, DHS in recent years has made an effort to systematize 
consideration of equitable discretion by enforcement actors, primarily 
through targeted resource distribution and prosecutorial discretion 
initiatives.  Nevertheless, as this part argues, a removal system that 
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allocates equitable consideration solely to enforcement actors is likely to 
fail to ensure normative justifiability. 
In prior work, I have explained why ICE prosecutors may be ill-situated 
to parse both the legal merit and normative equities of removal cases.238  
Even more than criminal prosecutors, ICE attorneys have training, 
experience, and incentives that orient them toward a professional role as 
protectors of public safety and national security, largely to the exclusion of 
distinctly secondary tasks such as evaluating the equitable merit of 
individual cases (at least until very late in the removal process).239  This 
“prosecutor bias” is compounded by intense workload pressures that leave 
ICE attorneys little choice but to handle their active cases—numbering in 
the hundreds—in an assembly-line, if not triage, fashion.240  Other 
institutional features raise additional concerns about ICE trial attorneys’ 
capacity to look closely at the equities of any particular case until the eve of 
a hearing.  These features include the lack of a right to counsel for indigent 
noncitizens, weak rules regarding disclosure of evidence that might be 
helpful to the noncitizen, and the absence of a sound structure for ensuring 
ICE accountability.241  Notably, the use of appropriate prosecutorial 
discretion does not appear to form any part of ICE attorneys’ performance 
metrics.242 
The Obama Administration avoided many of these problems when it 
chose to allocate the responsibility for implementing DACA and DAPA to 
the specialized unit within USCIS, rather than to ICE.  As we have seen, 
ICE’s strong sense of mission and crushing work burdens complicate its 
perception and evaluation of normative merits of removal in individual 
cases.243  In contrast, USCIS, as the benefits arm of DHS, has extensive 
experience in evaluating equities; indeed, that is one of its primary 
functions.244  Distributing equitable assessment duties across administrative 
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bodies (even if both are housed within DHS), at least for particular subsets 
of removal cases, may avoid the prosecutorial tunnel vision and 
desensitization to the humanitarian aspects of the job that can come to 
dominate the culture of law enforcement agencies like ICE.245 
Despite this institutional breakthrough, there remain significant 
drawbacks to a system that relies heavily on enforcement discretion for 
normative justifiability.  The next section focuses primarily on the agency’s 
failure to engage in equitable balancing when it comes to the removal of 
noncitizens with almost any level of criminal history.  It then explains how 
other factors, such as controversy and lack of finality, also hinder the 
effectiveness of enforcement discretion as an equitable tool on a systemic 
level. 
A.  The Criminal History Blind Spot 
In one key aspect, the Obama Administration has all but abandoned the 
exercise of discretion to inject equity into the removal process—namely, in 
removal cases involving persons with criminal histories.  To the contrary, 
DHS has used criminal history of almost any type as an irrevocable marker 
of undesirability.  To begin with, the agency’s prosecutorial discretion 
guidelines are unavailable to persons with almost any level of conviction.246  
So too with the President’s deferred action initiatives.  Even persons who 
have only misdemeanors on their records typically fall into one of the 
agency’s priorities for removal, and DACA is specifically unavailable to 
anyone with a “significant misdemeanor,” regardless of other equities or 
mitigating factors.247 
In addition, the immigration enforcement arms of the federal government 
have consistently pushed for the broadest and most severe interpretations of 
the criminal removal statutes possible.  For example, the government 
frequently attempts to bring minor drug crimes within the aggravated felony 
category.  These efforts, it turns out, have spawned important Supreme 
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Court rulings, and these rulings illustrate the front and center importance of 
prosecutorial discretion in modern immigration law.248 
Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder,249 decided in 2010, concerned a 
noncitizen who faced permanent deportation without possibility of 
equitable discretion despite being a longtime LPR and father of U.S. 
citizens.250  Jose Carachuri-Rosendo had two convictions:  one for simple 
marijuana possession and one for unlawful possession of a single Xanax 
pill—both misdemeanors under Texas state law.251  On the first charge, he 
was sentenced to twenty days in jail.252  The second conviction landed 
Carachuri-Rosendo in jail for ten days, after which the government tried to 
deport him as an aggravated felon.253  The Government argued that the two 
drug crimes would have made Carachuri-Rosendo a felony recidivist drug 
offender under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), had he been 
prosecuted by the federal government.254  But because no court had ever 
charged or found that Carachuri-Rosendo was a recidivist, the Court 
unanimously rejected the Government’s slash-and-burn argument.255 
In the 2013 case Moncrieffe v. Holder,256 ICE alleged that a longtime 
LPR’s first-offender guilty plea to possession of 1.3 grams of marijuana 
with intent to distribute was “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance” 
and therefore an aggravated felony.257  A complex chain of statutes 
determines whether something constitutes a federal drug trafficking crime, 
but ultimately it must be “an offense that the [CSA] makes punishable by 
more than one year’s imprisonment.”258  The problem in Moncrieffe’s case 
was that the Georgia statute at issue, like those of many other states, could 
be violated whether there was any kind of remuneration,259 and the CSA 
treats marijuana distribution as a misdemeanor if the defendant shared a 
small amount without compensation.260  Nevertheless, the government’s 
default position was to treat all marijuana distribution convictions as 
corresponding with the felony distribution offense, regardless of whether 
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there was remuneration, and therefore constitutive of aggravated 
felonies.261  The Supreme Court rejected this approach, seven to two, and 
took the opportunity to chide the Government for its overzealous tactics in 
these cases: 
This is the third time in seven years that we have considered whether the 
Government has properly characterized a low-level drug offense as “illicit 
trafficking in a controlled substance,” and thus an “aggravated felony.”  
Once again we hold that the Government’s approach defies “the 
commonsense conception” of these terms.262 
As Justice Sotomayor’s admonition indicates, Moncrieffe and Carachuri-
Rosendo are not isolated examples of government overreach in the criminal 
removal cases to have reached the Supreme Court in recent years.263  
Moreover, just this past Term, the Court handed down Mellouli v. Lynch,264 
which rejected the Government’s argument that a state drug paraphernalia 
conviction should be considered a controlled substance removal offense 
because it relates to “the drug trade in general.”265  The Government’s 
position was particularly strained in this case, because the state drug law 
included substances not federally controlled and the “paraphernalia” in 
question consisted of a sock.266  Again, the Court emphasized the 
incongruity between the relatively minor conviction at issue and the severe 
consequence of deportation, noting that under federal law, as well as the 
law of nineteen states, Mellouli’s conduct would not even be considered a 
criminal offense.267  These concerns came across clearly during oral 
argument in the case, which is partly why it was unsurprising to again see 
seven justices oppose the Government’s position.268 
Indiscriminate use of minor criminal history to impose the drastic 
consequences of detention, deportation, and bars to reentry is especially 
problematic because of the dire state of our nation’s misdemeanor courts.  
 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 1693 (quoting Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 573 (2010)). 
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felony under state law); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004) (rejecting the 
government’s argument that a DUI conviction was a crime of violence and therefore an 
aggravated felony). 
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 268. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 29–30, Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 
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offenses are generally extremely minor offenses; they’re not felonies.”); id. at 47 
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Following a recent explosion in arrests for low-level offenses, prosecutors 
now bring approximately ten million misdemeanor prosecutions each 
year.269  These prosecutions churn through court systems in which adequate 
representation is scarce, little attention is paid to evidence or individual 
equities, and bail and other process costs generally outweigh defendants’ 
perceived incentives to fight charges.270  The procedural protections in 
lower criminal courts are often even more deficient for noncitizens.271  
Consequently, the severity of deportation not only outweighs the gravity of 
many minor convictions, but such convictions also frequently result from 
processes “badly detached from the core legitimating precept of individual 
fault.”272 
DHS aggressively seeks to remove criminal aliens in other ways, too.  
For example, the government has been increasingly utilizing a provision of 
the INA that allows the agency to shuffle noncitizens who are not LPRs and 
who have convictions that it alone deems to be aggravated felonies into 
fast-track “administrative removal” proceedings, where there are even 
fewer procedural safeguards available than in regular immigration courts.273  
Meanwhile, ICE regularly trains sympathetic prosecutors on the 
immigration consequences of criminal convictions in order to help them 
maximize the likelihood of deportation.274  And where a local justice 
system’s actions are perceived to fall short of the federal government’s 
immigration enforcement process—perhaps by allowing an undocumented 
noncitizen to bond out of criminal custody during prosecution for a low-
level offense—ICE sometimes elects to deport the noncitizen while his or 
her criminal case is still pending.275 
The executive branch also has widely employed detention as part of its 
enforcement strategy against noncitizens with criminal history.276  As 
described above, in the 1990s Congress made civil detention mandatory for 
a wide variety of immigration offenses, and many other persons are subject 
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to discretionary detention on the basis of the government’s immigration 
charges.277  Indeed, the Obama Administration has easily surpassed 
Congress’s detention expectations, as most persons charged with any 
criminal grounds of removal are detained in prison-like conditions for part 
or all of the pendency of their proceedings.278  In fiscal year 2012, DHS put 
477,523 persons in civil immigration incarceration at some point during 
their removal process, at a cost of $2 billion to taxpayers.279 
Additionally, the Administration has dramatically increased federal 
prosecutions for the immigration offenses of illegal entry and illegal 
reentry.  In fact, federal prosecutions for immigration offenses have 
increased almost 60 percent over the past decade, and they made up the 
single largest category of federal prosecutions each year from 2008 to 
2012.280  There is more to the story than just the numbers, though, as the 
government employs criminal immigration prosecutions and civil removal 
proceedings as alternative or complementary methods of immigration 
enforcement.281 
Finally, the Obama Administration relies heavily on increased integration 
and communication with local law enforcement agencies both (1) to 
identify noncitizens with convictions and (2) to set priorities for 
enforcement against the eleven million persons residing in the United States 
without authorization.282  The vast bulk of the immigration agency’s 
interior enforcement against the undocumented begins with an arrest or 
other contact with local law enforcement, which then steers detainees into 
the deportation system through PEP or similar federal programs.283  The 
key point is that immigration authorities take little, if any, account of the 
circumstances of the noncitizen’s arrest or whether she has been prosecuted 
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or convicted.  More than a quarter of all noncitizens deported after local 
criminal arrest have never been convicted of any crime at all.284 
This phenomenon, which Eisha Jain aptly labels “arrests as 
regulation,”285 reveals the breadth of the Obama Administration’s 
conception of criminal history as a proxy for undesirability.  Suspected or 
potential criminal status acts as a sorting mechanism, whether or not an 
actual conviction ever results.  As Adam Cox and Eric Posner have 
suggested, a noncitizen’s mere contact with the criminal justice system 
raises a red flag for immigration officials and thus represents a rational (or 
at least highly efficient) approach to making the most of scarce 
resources.286 
The problem is that arrests convey next to nothing about culpability.287  
One out of every three persons in the United States can expect to be arrested 
in his or her life.288  Arrests can be erroneous, and they can be effectuated 
for reasons other than the expectation of criminal prosecution.289  Indeed, 
the regular use by police of arrests as a tool of social control is now well 
understood.290  Even arrest data are often inaccurate.291  Thus, arrest alone, 
especially for traffic, public order, or other low-level offenses, does not 
reliably indicate anything about dangerousness, assimilability, work 
productivity, or other components associated with desirable immigrant 
types.292 
Using local arrests as triggers for federal enforcement also threatens to 
reward racial profiling and other constitutional violations, at least to the 
extent that such practices are a part of local law enforcement.  Because local 
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actors are responsible for the vast majority of initial encounters between 
noncitizens and the government, they have significant influence over the 
implementation of immigration enforcement.293  As we have seen, arrested 
noncitizens, if unauthorized, are very likely to be placed into removal 
proceedings, regardless of whether they are ever convicted or otherwise fall 
within a high priority for removal.294  As a result, “sub-federal actors are 
able to decisively alter the mix of priority levels that characterize the 
deported population through participation in federal-local partnerships, state 
criminal law, and ordinary arrest, detention, and charging practices.”295 
Of particular importance, police officers making arrests with an eye to 
enforcement of federal immigration law, whether through cooperative 
relationships or on their own initiative, may have little incentive to comply 
with the Fourth Amendment.296  This is largely a consequence of the 
Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza297 not to apply 
the exclusionary rule to civil immigration proceedings, at least absent 
egregious violations.298  Because many of these low-level criminal arrests 
resulting in deportation never involve criminal prosecutions, constitutional 
rights violations go largely unchecked and, therefore, undeterred.299 
There is little doubt that modern policing strategies tend to result in 
disproportionate arrests of people of color, particularly black and Latino 
persons arrested for traffic and “public order” offenses.300  Studies have 
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suggested this trend may be exacerbated in locations where local law 
enforcement officers interact or share overlapping duties with federal 
immigration officials through state or local initiatives or cooperative 
enforcement programs.301  Both Department of Justice (DOJ) investigations 
and formal legal proceedings have revealed the potential for racial profiling 
in the policing of immigrants.302  Suspected immigrants may thus be 
particularly likely to have been arrested for illegitimate reasons.  By using 
arrests—whether or not they involve unconstitutional policing tactics—to 
trigger regulatory consequences, immigration law capitalizes on (or at least 
ignores) racial profiling and other unlawful policing by arresting officers. 
There are obvious political reasons for these enforcement choices.303  As 
Professor Peter Schuck has observed, “it is hard to imagine a higher 
enforcement priority” than targeting noncitizens with criminal history.304  
To be sure, criminal history provides the government with information 
about factors relevant to membership choices, such as respect for law, 
dangerousness, economic productivity, and so on.305  Accordingly, 
prioritizing noncitizens who have had run-ins with law enforcement is seen 
as an efficient means of sorting a very large pool of potential enforcement 
targets.306  But, critically, the Obama Administration’s categorical approach 
to noncitizens with criminal history means that the INA’s overly broad and 
severe provisions will fail to be tempered by equity. 
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This Article does not take a position here regarding how the federal 
government should evaluate the equities in cases involving noncitizens 
convicted of, or arrested for, crimes.  The point is that some balancing 
should take place in individual cases, even for “criminal noncitizens,” to 
safeguard against injustice and arbitrary action in the removal system.307  
While Congress, and probably most of the public, might want ICE to have 
broad capacity to seek removal of dangerous individuals, it does not follow 
that all removals of noncitizens with criminal history are justified.308  An 
LPR family man running a small business who pleaded guilty to a 
misdemeanor marijuana offense long ago presents different equitable 
considerations than a recently convicted rapist with few community ties—
yet both might be removed without any opportunity for discretionary relief 
or lawful opportunity to return.  An intoxicated person arrested after driving 
into a school bus occupies a morally distinct position from an elderly 
woman arrested for selling tamales in a parking lot; yet, if they are 
undocumented, both may become priorities for removal through the 
operation of the deportation machinery.309 
In short, not all noncitizens with convictions or arrests are similarly 
situated.  Removal of many noncitizens with criminal history will be 
appropriate, but for others it will be unjustifiably harsh in light of the 
relatively minor nature of their conduct and individual mitigating factors 
like rehabilitation, length of time in the United States, community and 
family ties, health concerns, age, and so on.310  Even unlawfully present 
noncitizens with criminal history will sometimes present circumstances that 
warrant forbearance of removal on proportionality grounds.311  While 
criminal history may be a reasonable enough way to establish deportation 
priorities, more than roughshod sorting is required for a system 
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administering such severe penalties to be just.  At the center of every 
deportation case, there is an individual who may have formed deep 
community bonds of family, faith, employment, and friendship.  And where 
this is true, deportation portends life-altering consequences both for that 
individual and for the family members, persons, and institutions at the other 
end of those connections.312  For the expansive deportation provisions in 
the immigration code to remain normatively tolerable, the equities and 
impact of removal in the individual case must be considered in some 
way.313 
When administrators rigidly apply overly broad and formally inflexible 
rules, they do “not merely fail to do justice, they may do positive 
injustice.”314  The Executive’s failure to carefully assess the merits of 
deporting individual noncitizens who may have significant equities on the 
basis of minor crime raises the specter of injustice.  Additionally, the 
justifiability of deportation becomes dubious when a noncitizen is brought 
into the system through racial profiling or other constitutional violations.315 
As this section has explained, the current Administration has failed to 
take account of individual fairness concerns when it comes to the removal 
of noncitizens with criminal history.  Instead, ICE indiscriminately and 
aggressively pursues noncitizens with even very minor convictions (or mere 
arrests).  This approach suggests that allocating the bulk of equitable 
authority to law enforcement actors comes with a significant risk that the 
deportation system will fail to administer appropriate justice in a large 
number of cases. 
B.  Controversy 
Another drawback of relying on enforcement discretion to keep the 
deportation system normatively justifiable is that executive actions in this 
area tend to arouse significant ire and controversy.  States, congresspersons, 
or members of the public may not approve of the particular manner in 
which the Executive is managing Congress’s delegation of enforcement 
power and may attempt to force modifications through legislation or 
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litigation.  We have already begun to see this play out in challenges to 
President Obama’s most recent discretionary enforcement initiatives. 
Responding to one such challenge brought by twenty-seven states, on 
February 16, 2015, Judge Hanen of the Southern District of Texas issued a 
preliminary injunction halting the rollout of DAPA and the expanded 
version of DACA.316  In the district court’s view, the affirmative, 
categorical, and large-scale nature of these programs overcame the 
substantial case law that typically insulates agency nonenforcement 
decisions from judicial review.317  The court found DACA and DAPA to 
constitute an agency “rule,” which would subject the agency to the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) formal rulemaking procedures, 
including the provision of public notice and an opportunity to comment.318  
On May 26, 2015, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit declined to grant the federal government’s request for an emergency 
stay of Judge Hanen’s preliminary injunction.319 
Meanwhile, members of Congress have introduced bills to defund parts 
of DHS or otherwise block executive action.320  Some academics have 
voiced concerns too, objecting that the initiatives’ scale, prospective 
“licensing” of future violations, and grant of the benefit of work 
authorization makes them unlike prosecutorial discretion and undermines 
the deterrence goals of immigration law.321  Resolving whether DACA and 
DAPA are constitutional or consistent with the APA lies beyond the scope 
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historically involved case-by-case decisions, not the blanket relief that DACA affords.”); 
Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion:  Deferred Action, Unlawful 
Presence, and Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1187–92 (2015) (arguing that 
programs like DAPA create a “moral hazard” for continuing and future violations of 
immigration law); Rubenstein, supra note 153, at 86 (arguing that DACA raises 
constitutional concerns because “qualifying immigrants are afforded permission to remain in 
the United States and, by default, permission to reside in the states and cities of their 
choosing”); McConnell, supra note 3 (Judge Hanen’s “injunction isn’t about prosecutorial 
discretion.  It is about granting illegal aliens benefits not allowed by law”); Zachary Price, 
Two Cheers for OLC’s Opinion, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/ 
2014/11/two-cheers-for-olcs-opinion.html (arguing that DACA and DAPA “go beyond 
either conventional agency priority-setting or ad hoc deferred action by deeming broad 
categories of immigrants presumptively eligible for a prospective promise of non-
enforcement”) [http://perma.cc/E5U3-NDC3]; Price, supra note 120, at 761 (arguing that 
DACA “removes the risk of enforcement altogether”). 
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of this Article.322  For now, it is enough to observe that Congress has both 
functionally and explicitly delegated broad responsibility to the Executive 
when it comes to setting immigration enforcement priorities,323 and DACA 
as implemented retains key features that characterize prosecutorial 
discretion.324  Moreover, DACA and DAPA have only retrospective effect, 
making their effect on future deterrence highly speculative.325 
The key point for present purposes is that these lawsuits, bills, and 
criticisms illustrate the distraction and controversy that executive attempts 
to systematize equitable discretion in the deportation system can and do 
engender.  Because of the politically charged nature of immigration issues, 
challenges and attacks of this kind are likely to continue and to arise again.  
The Obama Administration already has had to expend a great deal of effort 
and resources to defend its discretionary enforcement actions against 
lawsuits and public criticism, and future administrations likely will take 
note of what occurred with DACA and DAPA.  The end result may be less 
transparency or, worse yet, less equity.  Either outcome is out of step with 
fundamental values of fairness and proportionality in the American legal 
system. 
C.  Status Quo Equity 
Adjudicative equitable relief from removal typically results in finality.  
Where the charged noncitizen is unlawfully present, successfully obtaining 
adjudicative relief means that he or she is able to adjust to a more 
permanent status, through statutory processes like asylum or cancellation of 
removal.326  Cancellation is “a durable form of relief,” in Margaret Taylor’s 
 
 322. To be clear, I believe that President Obama’s implementation of his immigration 
enforcement authority through DACA and DAPA is constitutional.  In September 2014, I, 
along with 135 other immigration law professors and scholars, signed a letter outlining the 
Executive’s authority to use discretion to protect individuals or groups from deportation. See 
Letter from 136 Law Professors and Scholars to President (Sept. 3, 2014), 
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/Law-Professor-Letter.pdf [http://perma.cc/TZ9H-53WF].  
For recent accounts concluding that DACA and DAPA are within the President’s 
discretionary enforcement authority, see Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 231, Lauren Gilbert, 
Obama’s Ruby Slippers:  Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of Immigration Reform, 
116 W. VA. L. REV. 255 (2013), and Kalhan, supra note 226.  For opposing views, see 
Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On:  The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. 
L. REV. 781 (2013), Margulies, supra note 321, and Rubenstein, supra note 153, at 85–86, 
137–39. 
 323. See 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (2012) (giving the Secretary of Homeland Security authority 
for “establishing national immigration enforcement policies and priorities”); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1103(a) (2012) (conferring broad power to the Secretary of Homeland Security over “the 
administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration 
and naturalization of aliens”). 
 324. See generally supra Parts I.B, II.B.3. 
 325. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 231, at 82–83. 
 326. See, e.g., INA § 208(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1) (providing that noncitizens granted 
asylum cannot be removed, must be authorized to work, and may travel abroad with consent 
of the Attorney General); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (providing that cancellation of removal for 
non-LPRs will adjust the recipient’s status to one “lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence”). 
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words, amounting to, “essentially, legalization on a case-by-case basis.”327  
Similarly, adjudicative success for lawfully present noncitizens facing 
deportation generally means that either the government’s removal charges 
were unfounded or the person was able to obtain discretionary relief, 
perhaps through (re)adjustment of status with a waiver.328  In either 
situation, the noncitizen exits removal proceedings with her legal status 
intact and faces almost no possibility that charges will be filed again unless 
a new triggering event, such as a new conviction, arises. 
In sharp contrast, the implementation of equity through enforcement 
discretion can do little more than preserve the status quo.  Deferred action, 
administrative closure, or termination of proceedings typically do not 
resolve the underlying issue that triggered the initiation of removal 
proceedings.  An LPR with a deportable conviction who is offered 
administrative closure as a matter of prosecutorial discretion remains 
perpetually subject to possible removal.  An undocumented youth who 
receives a reprieve under DACA remains without legal status (though she 
may at least temporarily stop accruing unlawful presence and gain 
permission to work).  Instead, that person, like many other beneficiaries of 
equitable prosecutorial discretion, occupies what Geoffrey Heeren has 
called the “status of nonstatus,” which sanctions physical presence without 
bestowing rights or benefits and does not offer a path to increased 
stability.329 
In this respect, prosecutorial discretion in deportation proceedings 
achieves something different than its analogue does in the criminal system.  
Discretionary decisions not to charge or prosecute are useful in the criminal 
system because they do not implicate double jeopardy, and the public might 
want prosecutors to be able to reconsider discretionary decisions if new 
information arises or priorities change.330  This also may be a benefit of 
discretionary forbearance in the deportation system.331  But in the 
meantime, the uncharged criminal suspect typically enjoys the same liberty 
as one who is tried and acquitted.  Moreover, the uncharged suspect is in a 
considerably better position than one who has been prosecuted and 
convicted, even if the person’s circumstances lead to a mitigated sentence 
of probation, community sentence, or time served.  And because most 
criminal offenses have statutes of limitation, at some point an alleged 
offender will know she no longer need fear prosecution. 
 
 327. Taylor, supra note 113, at 532. 
 328. See, e.g., Medina-Rosales v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding 
that a noncitizen who received LPR status after entry and who meets the criteria to readjust 
status may seek a discretionary waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)). 
 329. Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of Nonstatus, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1129–33 (2015); 
see also Jennifer Chacón, Liminal Legality:  Developments in Immigration Enforcement 
Crime Control and Beyond, 92 DENVER U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (describing the legal 
ambiguity of DACA and DAPA). 
 330. See Bowers, supra note 13, at 1657, 1685. 
 331. See Interview with ICE trial attorney in small Midwestern office, supra note 242, at 
3–4 (describing how, in the exercise of discretion, she sometimes elects not to file a charging 
document with the immigration court but retains it in the event that new negative 
information about the noncitizen comes to light). 
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For deportable noncitizens, on the other hand, the difference between 
adjudicative discretionary relief from removal and a favorable exercise of 
enforcement discretion is considerable.  Receiving deferred action is better 
than getting deported (or remaining completely undocumented), but in the 
end it amounts to “immigration status purgatory.”332  But because actual 
equitable adjudicative relief is now so tightly constrained, it may be an 
impossible (or, at best, perilous) course to pursue in adversarial 
proceedings.  For that reason, even deportable noncitizens with meritorious 
cases for relief often accept ICE’s offer of administrative closure rather than 
risk venturing to a hearing.333 
The bottom line is that even noncitizens who receive a favorable exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion remain in legal limbo.  As a result, they remain 
at higher risk for discrimination and exploitation than persons who have 
lawful immigration status.  Notwithstanding their contributions to the 
economy and tax base, noncitizens who receive favorable prosecutorial 
discretion but lack lawful status also remain excluded from healthcare 
coverage, social security retirement, and other benefits that are afforded to 
noncitizens in lawful status.334  In any system that allowed for a greater 
measure of adjudicative discretion, many such noncitizens might actually 
be able to regularize their status and fully enter communities that they have 
been a part of and contributed to for many years, albeit in the shadows.  
Under the current system of executive-administered discretion, however, 
even noncitizens with strong equities can expect little more than to remain 
in a position of distressing uncertainty and inequality. 
IV.  IMPROVING IMMIGRATION EQUITY 
As this Article has argued, the risk of normative injustice in the removal 
system increased substantially when Congress all but wrote out of the 
statute adjudicative equitable consideration for both lawfully present and 
undocumented noncitizens, while at the same time casting removal grounds 
so wide that even LPRs with old, minor convictions—or other criminal 
history not even recognized as a conviction by the criminal system—might 
find themselves mandatorily detained and then permanently banished. 
In recent years, the executive branch has taken some important measures 
to preserve equity in our new deportation system.  Prosecutorial discretion, 
at least in theory, helps ensure that the extreme sanctions of deportation and 
bars to lawful reentry are not imposed without individual consideration of 
proportionality and fairness.  In practice, DHS’s push to encourage ICE 
officers and attorneys to evaluate equitable norms when making 
enforcement decisions appears to have been somewhat successful in select 
jurisdictions but thus far fails to achieve anything close to nationwide 
consistency and efficacy. 
 
 332. Kalhan, supra note 226, at 68. 
 333. See Cade, supra note 11, at 33–34, 77–78. 
 334. See Heeren, supra note 329, at 1165–79. 
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DACA represents an important innovation in the use of prosecutorial 
discretion to implement proportionality and fairness in the immigration 
system.  The program reflects the Obama Administration’s reasonable 
belief that the deportation of undocumented noncitizens who can establish 
specific criteria will categorically be disproportional, at least barring other 
indicia of undesirability.  The program’s design also capitalizes on a 
division of expertise across immigration agencies by allocating equitable 
evaluation to specially trained benefits officers in USCIS rather than 
enforcement officers within ICE.  However, DACA has engendered 
significant controversy, and DHS’s efforts to expand the program or 
identify other groups deserving of categorical discretion have thus far been 
hampered by federal litigation. 
Focusing limited enforcement resources at the border and on noncitizens 
who encounter criminal justice systems is a defensible, if imperfect, 
approach to decreasing the likelihood of disproportionate deportations.  If, 
in contrast, the Administration were to put its resources into combing 
school rosters for undocumented youth, raiding noncitizen’s homes or 
workplaces, or policing emergency rooms, the likely result would be an 
increased proportion of noncitizens facing removal despite strong bonds, 
significant hardship, and fewer negative factors. 
Nevertheless, these efforts are thus far inadequate to ensure the system’s 
normative justifiability.  In particular, recent administrations’ overreliance 
on the criminal history proxy means that noncitizens with even minor 
convictions and strong equities are unlikely to receive much individualized 
consideration regarding the merits of their removal.  The following sections 
outline a range of legislative and executive reforms that would help restore 
(or at least improve) considerations of proportionality and fairness in the 
deportation system. 
A.  Legislative Reforms 
Congress bears primary responsibility for the shift in equitable discretion 
from adjudicators to enforcers in the modern immigration scheme.  The 
most direct possibilities for redress also lie with Congress.  If federal 
lawmakers were to roll back the breadth and severity of the removal 
grounds, and restore mechanisms for adjudicative relief from removal for 
both lawfully present and undocumented noncitizens, the pressure on the 
Executive to adopt measures that ensure that individual deportations remain 
proportional and justified would decrease.  Toward this end, Congress 
should consider implementing the following reforms. 
Critically, Congress should narrow the criminal history removal grounds, 
which make many lawfully present noncitizens deportable on the basis of 
minor offenses, despite deep connections and contributions in this country 
and substantial hardships faced abroad.  One important step would be to 
revise the aggravated felony ground to exclude offenses that do not reliably 
indicate that the noncitizen poses a threat to public safety.  For example, 
offenses designated as misdemeanors under the applicable penal code 
should never qualify as aggravated felonies.  This would help ensure that 
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the severe sanctions associated with aggravated felonies—including 
removal without the possibility of discretionary relief and permanent bar on 
lawful reentry—are a proportional response, which Congress recognized 
when a narrower version of the aggravated felony category was originally 
enacted in 1988.335 
In general, misdemeanors are insufficiently reliable indicators of 
wrongdoing to justify the imposition of severe immigration consequences.  
Misdemeanor marijuana possession offenses in particular have become an 
increasingly problematic ground on which to base deportation.336  Recently, 
several states have legalized the use of marijuana for medical or 
recreational purposes, and numerous other states are considering similar 
measures.337  Even in states where marijuana possession remains 
prohibited, violations typically are lightly sanctioned and often categorized 
only as civil infractions.338  At least one in three persons in the United 
States has tried marijuana, including our three most recent Presidents.339  
Accordingly, Congress should scrutinize this deportation ground and either 
expand the limited petty offense exception or do away with removal on the 
basis of marijuana possession all together. 
Additionally, Congress should consider enacting statutory limitations that 
would prohibit removal of lawfully present noncitizens on the basis of very 
old convictions.  Limiting the possibility of removal to a statutorily 
determined period following the date of conviction would account for 
youthfulness, redemption, and the accumulation or strengthening of social 
bonds in this country over time.340  One route would be to enact a generally 
applicable statute of limitation, such as fifteen years, for all removal 
offenses.  This approach would have the benefit of administrative ease.  
Alternatively, Congress might want to calibrate the length of time 
appropriate for response based on the underlying seriousness of the 
applicable removal offense.  (Perhaps the most egregious removal 
offenses—for example, murder, rape, and human trafficking—should not 
have a statute of limitations.)  Either way, this kind of reform would 
decrease the number of lawfully present noncitizens subject to 
disproportionate removal in light of the nature of their underlying offenses 
and the mitigating factors that typically accrue through significant periods 
of time spent living, working, and raising families in this country. 
 
 335. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 336. See generally Cunnings, supra note 55. 
 337. Id. at 522–24 (discussing legalization of recreational marijuana use in Colorado, 
Washington, Oregon, Alaska, and Washington D.C., and similar legislation likely to be 
proposed in 2016 in Arizona, California, Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada). 
 338. Id. at 526–28; see also Cade, supra note 58, at 1773. 
 339. Lydia Saad, In U.S., 38 Percent Have Tried Marijuana, Little Changed Since ‘80s, 
GALLUP (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163835/tried-marijuana-little-changed-
80s.aspx [http://perma.cc/7LVY-TKUQ]. 
 340. See Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time:  Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, 58 
UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1747 (2011) (“Tying the statute of limitations to the date of conviction 
has the advantage of making time for and recognizing redemption, and of accounting for 
youthfulness at the time of the crime.”). 
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An alternative approach that would address the same concerns would be 
to set probationary periods for the applicability of each removable offense.  
Congress has long done this with crimes classified as involving moral 
turpitude, which can only form the basis for removal of a lawfully present 
noncitizen if the offense is committed within the first five years after 
admission.341  All criminal history removal offenses could be made 
contingent on the same probationary period, or, again, Congress might wish 
to calibrate the applicable period based on the egregiousness of the 
underlying conviction category.  It would be reasonable, for example, to 
assign a short probationary period for removal based on minor controlled 
substance offenses and a longer period for those convicted of felony drug 
trafficking crimes.  Like a statute of limitations, this approach would 
recognize that after a substantial period of time living in this country, 
noncitizens will develop bonds of family, community, faith, and so on that 
will generally outweigh the justifiability of imposing deportation in addition 
to whatever punishment already has been imposed through the criminal 
justice system. 
Federal lawmakers should also restore power to adjudicators to determine 
whether removal is appropriate in a wider swath of cases than allowed 
under current law.  First, given today’s extensive connections between the 
criminal and immigration systems, it makes sense to reboot the JRAD 
mechanism repealed in 1990, which allowed criminal court sentencing 
judges to determine whether the additional sanction of deportation would be 
unwarranted in an individual noncitizen defendant’s case.342  Similarly, 
Congress should enact legislation clarifying that “convictions” that have 
been expunged or set aside—whether through diversionary programs, 
judicial expungements, or pardons—will not trigger removal grounds.  
These changes would help ensure that noncitizens are not deported on the 
basis of criminal history that the criminal justice system no longer treats as 
a conviction or that a sentencing judge has determined would not warrant 
the additional sanction of removal.343 
At the federal immigration court level, Congress should reallocate broad 
power to immigration judges to balance the equitable fairness of 
deportation in individual cases.  Cancellation of removal, as defined under 
current law, is far too limited to adequately ensure proportionality for both 
LPRs and undocumented noncitizens.  Here, too, Congress might 
reasonably determine that a range of discretionary relief is appropriate, 
depending on factors like the nature of the underlying removal category and 
the immigration status of the noncitizen.  It might be appropriate to make 
discretionary relief from removal somewhat more stringent for 
 
 341. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012) (providing for the 
deportation of a lawfully present noncitizen if he or she is (1) convicted of one crime 
involving moral turpitude within five years after the date of admission and (2) a sentence of 
one year or longer may be imposed).  Noncitizens who have been convicted of more than 
one crime involving moral turpitude are deportable regardless of the dates of the offenses. 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
 342. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
 343. See Cade, supra note 88, at 380–81; Cade, supra note 58, at 1758. 
2015] ENFORCING IMMIGRATION EQUITY 717 
undocumented noncitizens than for those who are lawfully resident, as 
under current law.  Similarly, Congress might reasonably determine that 
noncitizens with egregious criminal histories or other evidence of 
significant bad acts have a very high burden to demonstrate that the pain of 
deportation outweighs their positive equities.  The bottom line, though, is 
that a justice system committed to proportionality requires immigration 
judges to have adequate power to ensure that removal and corresponding 
bars to reentry are normatively justified in all individual immigration cases.  
If Congress wishes to ensure that all noncitizens who commit immigration 
violations or criminal offenses are penalized in some fashion—in addition 
to the sanctions already administered by the criminal justice system—these 
concerns could be more appropriately addressed through the enactment of a 
graduated system of sanctions (e.g., civil penalties, delays in immigration 
benefits, et cetera), which could be calibrated to the specifics of the 
individual case.344  In any event, the statutory annual limit on cancellation 
grants for non-LPRs should be repealed, as this cap constrains the 
availability of relief for many individuals who can meet even the very high 
hardship threshold required under current law.345 
There is also much Congress should do to improve the procedural 
protections currently afforded noncitizens in removal proceedings.  
Procedural mechanisms work to help ensure that adjudicators or other 
agency decision makers (including prosecutors) have an incentive and 
opportunity to consider the merits and equities of individual cases.  For 
example, lawmakers could give noncitizens facing removal a right to 
appointed counsel if they cannot afford an attorney.  Recent studies have 
shown strong correlations between the assistance of counsel and success in 
removal proceedings,346 suggesting that in the modern system, attorneys 
play a critical role in helping noncitizens avoid inappropriate removals.  
Additionally, Congress could increase statutory obligations on the 
government to turn over any evidence in its possession bearing on the 
noncitizen’s right to remain.347  Various commentators have argued that 
these and other procedural reforms are needed to “see justice done” in 
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removal proceedings.348  While procedural reforms would not directly 
remediate the current system’s reliance on executive discretion to ensure 
proportionality, they would at least improve the likelihood that noncitizens 
who do qualify for the limited forms of discretionary relief still available 
will prevail in highly adversarial, deeply backlogged immigration 
proceedings. 
Finally, legislation providing a path to lawful status for certain groups of 
undocumented noncitizens in the United States would alleviate the burden 
on executive branch officials to sort among approximately eleven million 
deportable persons, many of whom have developed substantial ties in this 
country.349  Reform might target specific groups, such as those who have 
temporarily benefited from President Obama’s DACA program.  Indeed, 
the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (“the 
DREAM Act”), which Congress has considered several times in recent 
years and which passed the Senate in 2013, would have done just that.350  If 
enacted, the DREAM Act would provide a lawful status for noncitizens 
who came to the United States before age sixteen, lived here continuously, 
earned a high school diploma or equivalent, attended college or served in 
the military for at least two years, and did not have disqualifying 
convictions.351  The DREAM Act would thus remove the threat of 
deportation for a portion of the noncitizen population with especially strong 
equities and little or no personal responsibility for the immigration 
violations that make them removable. 
Lawmakers should consider other categories of deportable noncitizens 
for legalization, as well.  For example, Congress may wish to provide a path 
to lawful immigration status for law-abiding, productive noncitizens with 
U.S. citizen children—another group for whom the sanction and collateral 
consequences of deportation often will be excessively harsh.  Perhaps 
Congress could take an even broader legalization approach and focus 
primarily on length of residence in the United States to establish a path to 
lawful status for currently present unauthorized noncitizens, as it did with 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.352 
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 352. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 contained two legalization 
programs.  One was based on residence in the United States since at least January 1, 1982, 
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Reforms such as these would help restore proportionality to the 
deportation system, decrease pressure on severely overburdened 
immigration courts, and eschew much of the controversy and inefficiency 
endemic in a system that relies so heavily on executive discretion to ensure 
normative justifiability.  However, because any categorical legalization 
legislation is likely to (1) be retrospective in application, and (2) reflect line 
drawing that on some level will be arbitrary, such efforts alone will fail to 
ensure that noncitizens with strong humanitarian factors who fall outside 
the program’s eligibility requirements can avoid unfair deportations.  
Accordingly, Congress should consider enacting the entire panoply of 
reforms proposed here, including both legalization for particularly 
sympathetic groups and measures that create the structures necessary for 
individuation in removal decisions. 
 It must be acknowledged, however, that such reforms face an uphill 
battle.  Year after year—for over a decade now—multiple bipartisan efforts 
to engineer comprehensive immigration reform have failed.353  Legalization 
programs are especially controversial, but even less ambitious immigration 
reforms raise political firestorms.354  Even if a future Congress is able to 
pass immigration legislation of some sort, it may fail to bring changes that 
substantially soften the indiscriminate harshness of the current deportation 
laws, instead continuing to rely on prosecutorial discretion to address 
proportionality concerns.  The following section discusses steps that the 
executive branch might take to further improve the removal system in the 
absence of legislative action. 
B.  Improving Executive Discretion 
As I have argued, the primary deficiencies in the Obama 
Administration’s implementation of fairness through enforcement 
discretion are (1) inconsistency in evaluating the normative merits of 
individual removal cases across and within jurisdictions and (2) failure to 
balance equities in cases involving noncitizens with almost any kind of 
criminal history.355 
With respect to lack of consistency, DHS must do more than issue 
guidelines on the importance of prosecutorial discretion in the removal 
system.  Guidelines and trainings are important, but ground-level ICE 
operatives also need real incentives to exercise equitable discretion in 
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consistent and effective ways.  I have suggested how the immigration 
agencies might create such incentives in more detail elsewhere and briefly 
reiterate some of those points here.356  First, each individual noncitizen 
facing removal should have his or her case assigned to an individual ICE 
attorney prosecutor—or, as a second best option in the initial stages of 
proceedings, a small unit—who ultimately will be responsible for litigating 
the hearing.  Ideally this assignment should be made before charges are 
filed with the immigration court, and, at the least, case-handling 
responsibility should be designated before the first calendar hearing in 
proceedings.  This vertical prosecution design would elevate ICE attorneys’ 
incentive to scrutinize individual cases for both merit and possible 
favorable discretion because they would know from the outset that they 
would bear ultimate responsibility for litigating the matter.357  It would also 
provide a clear channel of communication for a noncitizen facing removal 
who wants to make a case that he or she warrants favorable discretion.358  
Relatedly, ICE officials’ appropriate exercise of discretion should become 
part of their regular performance evaluations, for which it apparently plays 
no role at present.359  This change would similarly increase the incentives 
for early, individualized examination of the merits and equities of 
noncitizens’ deportation cases. 
Another important procedural reform would require ICE attorneys to turn 
over the noncitizen’s “A-file” (excepting confidential information) in any 
case in which the individual intends to contest removability, seek relief, or 
obtain the assistance of counsel.360  I suggested above that Congress 
mandate this responsibility through statute, but in the absence of legislation, 
the Executive could implement the reform through rulemaking or 
administrative policy.  This obligation would give noncitizens access to 
documents that might bear on their ability to rebut the government’s 
charges of deportability or to establish eligibility for discretionary relief 
from the immigration judge.  It would also lead trial attorneys to scrutinize 
cases earlier in the process than they currently do, making it more likely 
that low-priority cases would be screened out.361 
The government might take a number of steps to address its failure to 
adequately engage in normative balancing before the deportation of 
noncitizens with criminal history.  First, an enforcement policy that aims to 
 
 356. See generally Cade, supra note 11. 
 357. Id.  Even if vertical prosecution assignments are not made before removal 
proceedings are begun, an attorney should review every charging document before it is filed 
in immigration court, as others and I have suggested. See CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS, 
supra note 348; Cade, supra note 11. 
 358. Under current agency guidance, noncitizens in detention or facing removal 
proceedings who believe they merit favorable discretion are instructed to submit their 
request to a general mailbox or telephone number for the relevant agency subdivision. See 
Frequently Asked Questions Relating to Executive Action on Immigration, DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC.:  U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/ 
immigrationAction/faqs (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/T2CP-6GCZ]. 
 359. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
 360. See Cade, supra note 11, at 62. 
 361. Id. at 70–74. 
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ensure that removals are not unjustified would prioritize among offenders, 
focusing on those whose convictions suggest a threat to public safety.  
Recent policy revisions under DHS Secretary Johnson take a small step in 
this direction, but do not go far enough.362  Barring other negative factors, 
the government generally should not seek to deport noncitizens whose only 
criminal history consists of low-level offenses (let alone mere arrests).  This 
approach would recognize that the gravity of minor convictions is generally 
not proportional to the severity of deportation.  Misdemeanor convictions, it 
is increasingly recognized, are particularly unreliable indicators of 
culpability or wrongdoing.363  At a minimum, federal enforcers should stop 
filing and zealously litigating removal cases that seek the most egregious 
immigration outcomes possible for nonserious offenders.364 
Second, ICE could implement a general policy of declining to seek the 
removal of noncitizens on the basis of criminal history that is not 
considered a continuing conviction under the applicable penal law.  
Noncitizens whose convictions have been deferred, expunged, pardoned, or 
set aside cannot easily be considered out of step with the social norms of 
the communities in which they live.  To the contrary, in such cases the 
criminal justice system has formally recognized that the noncitizen’s 
rehabilitation, remorse, reintegration, or other mitigating factors warrant 
removing (or avoiding altogether) the specter of continuing direct or 
collateral consequences.  Seen in this light, these ameliorating criminal 
justice processes can serve as a valuable surrogate for the equitable 
balancing that should take place in removal proceedings.365  Pardons, 
expungements, and similar events signify to enforcement officials that 
banishing the noncitizen on the basis of the underlying criminal history 
would not be proportional, absent other indicia of undesirability or threat to 
public safety.  Thus, these actions could function as “disproportionality 
rules of thumb,” counseling against deportation in the usual case but not 
binding the agency when a case presents factors that warrant overcoming 
the presumption.  To be sure, pardons and judicial expungements may be 
easier to obtain in some jurisdictions than others, resulting in 
 
 362. See Johnson Policies Memo, supra note 159, at 3–4 (noncitizens with one or more 
felonies are a top priority for enforcement, while noncitizens convicted of one “significant 
misdemeanor” or any three misdemeanors (other than traffic violations) remain the agency’s 
second-highest priority). 
 363. See Cade, supra note 58, at 1808–11; supra text accompanying note 283.  The 
government should also exercise discretion not to pursue removal in situations where the 
noncitizen was brought to immigration proceedings through racial profiling or other 
constitutional violations.  While such situations may not raise proportionality concerns, they 
do implicate another aspect of the removal system’s normative justifiability. See Cade, supra 
note 52, at 198–203. 
 364. See supra text accompanying notes 249–68 (discussing the government’s losses 
before the Supreme Court in cases such as Mellouli, Carachuri, Moncrieffe, and Lopez). 
 365. I develop this potential administrative reform further in a forthcoming essay that 
takes as its launching point an August 2015 sentencing order by Federal District Court Judge 
Jack B. Weinstein, in which Judge Weinstein made a judicial recommendation against 
deportation despite the absence of statutory authority to do so. See Jason A. Cade, Return of 
the JRAD, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2015). 
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inconsistencies.366  That fact does not present a persuasive reason not to 
adopt this proposal, however, because inconsistencies are already endemic 
in the criminal deportation system.  Not all prosecutors have the same 
priorities or resources.  Similar offenses can result in disparate immigration 
consequences, depending on how the state defines the crime.367  Indeed, a 
deportation system that deferred to these disproportionality rules of thumb 
might actually promote consistency by reducing the impact of disparate 
outcomes for noncitizens caught up in the criminal justice systems of 
different jurisdictions. 
Finally, the Executive should generally not seek to remove lawfully 
present noncitizens on the basis of criminal history from the distant past.  A 
noncitizen whose conviction was obtained long ago is unlikely to pose a 
continuing threat to public safety or social mores.368  To this end, the 
government should direct immigration prosecutors to exercise (or at least 
seriously consider) favorable discretion where the conviction is sufficiently 
attenuated by time and no other negative factors are present.369  This 
“administrative laches” policy would help compensate for the absence of 
limitations periods in the deportation statutory scheme.370  Undoubtedly, 
DHS would instruct ICE attorneys to continue to prosecute cases that raise 
 
 366. See Barkow, supra note 123, at 1349; MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, NAT’L ASSOC. OF 
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, NACDL RESTORATION OF RIGHTS RESOURCE PROJECT, CHART # 
4—JUDICIAL EXPUNGEMENT, SEALING, AND SET-ASIDE (2015), http://www.nacdl.org/ 
uploadedFiles/files/resource_center/2012_restoration_project/Judicial_Expungement_Sealin
g_and_Set-Aside.pdf [http://perma.cc/R3MN-BY96]; MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, NAT’L 
ASSOC. OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, NACDL RESTORATION OF RIGHTS RESOURCE PROJECT, 
CHART # 3—CHARACTERISTICS OF PARDON AUTHORITIES (2015), https://www.nacdl.org/ 
uploadedFiles/files/resource_center/2012_restoration_project/Characteristics_of_Pardon_Au
thorities.pdf [http://perma.cc/MB2U-N85P]. 
 367. See, e.g., Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions:  
Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1735 
(2011) (“Under a categorical analysis, two people who commit the same offense but are able 
to secure different plea deals or are prosecuted in jurisdictions that define the offense 
differently will face different immigration consequences.”). 
 368. See Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for U.S. 
Citizenship, 87 IND. L.J. 1571, 1627–28 (2012) (discussing sociological research indicating 
that the risk of recidivism decreases over time and age, including recent studies suggesting 
that individuals who stay arrest-free for seven years following prior contact with the criminal 
justice system “pose very little risk of future crime”). 
 369. DHS’s November 2014 memo on the agency’s enforcement priorities hints at the 
possibility of discretion for persons with criminal history, but requires supervisory approval 
and lacks the sharpness necessary to ensure that agents engage in balancing to ensure 
proportionality in every individual case. See Johnson Priorities Memo, supra note 159, at 5–
6 (indicating that noncitizens falling within the agency’s top priority should be removed 
unless, “in the judgment of an ICE Field Office Director, CBP Sector Chief, or CBP Director 
of Field Operations, there are compelling and exceptional factors that clearly indicate the 
alien is not a threat to national security, border security, or public safety and should not 
therefore be an enforcement priority”); id. at 5 (“Likewise, aliens in Priority 2 should be 
removed . . . unless, in the judgment of an ICE Field Office Director, CBP Sector Chief, 
CBP Director of Field Operations, USCIS District Director, or USCIS Service Center 
Director, there are factors indicating the alien is not a threat to national security, border 
security, or public safety and should not therefore be an enforcement priority.”). 
 370. See supra notes 340–41 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress should adopt 
statutes of limitations or probationary periods for the criminal removal grounds). 
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other indicia of danger or undesirability, regardless of the passage of time 
since a conviction.  Likely, too, egregious offenses (e.g., rape and murder) 
would be exempted from this policy, and reasonably so. 
Executive reforms such as these would help further justice in removal 
proceedings.  If ICE attorneys and agents are not up to the job of exercising 
discretion in these ways or for these groups of noncitizens, the Executive 
should expand upon the insights gleaned from DACA by outsourcing 
discretionary consideration in a wider swath of cases to specialized units 
within USCIS.371  For example, as Margaret Taylor has suggested, the 
Executive might implement a policy allowing noncitizens to proactively file 
affirmative non-LPR cancellation of removal applications with USCIS.372  
Additionally, as Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia has argued, DHS could use the 
APA to issue administrative rules governing prosecutorial discretion and 
deferred action.373  This approach would open up the possibility of judicial 
review, provide greater clarity and uniformity, and possibly avoid some of 
the controversy that attends to executive-based equity.  The general lack of 
finality, institutional discomfort, and other endemic drawbacks will remain, 
however, relegating such administrative approaches to a second-best 
solution to a deeply systemic problem.374 
CONCLUSION 
Congressional amendments to the immigration code in the 1980s and 
1990s set in motion a radical transformation of immigration law, the full 
implications of which are still being realized.  The decline of formal 
channels for ensuring that individual deportations are proportional and 
equitable has shifted responsibility to the Executive to implement rigid 
immigration rules in a normatively defensible way.  In recent years, the 
Obama Administration has endeavored to promote fairness through targeted 
use of resources and prosecutorial discretion, and by and large these efforts 
have been laudable.  Nevertheless, relying solely on law enforcement actors 
to keep the system equitable has thus far come up short.  In particular, the 
administration of the current removal system inadequately addresses the 
need to assess individualized equities in deportation cases, especially in 
cases that concern noncitizens who have criminal history. 
If Congress or the Executive do not take further steps to make the 
deportation system proportional, the responsibility to promote the value of 
individualized equity-based decision making in regard to life-defining legal 
choices about deportation will fall to federal courts.  Indeed, this is the 
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 373. See Wadhia, supra note 193, at 282–86, 294–95. 
 374. See Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred:  Deferred Action, Prosecutorial 
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theme of a number of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in this field.  As 
I have suggested elsewhere, a majority of justices appear uncomfortable 
with—and motivated to regulate—the modern immigration regime’s lack of 
adjudicative equity.375  Underlying this emerging jurisprudence is the 
principle that severe penalties imposed on the basis of criminal convictions 
must be predicated on considerations of individualized justice, a topic I take 
up more fully in another project.376 
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 376. See Jason A. Cade, Judging Immigration Equity (work in progress on file with 
author). 
